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Introduction: A Dirigiste State in Transition?     
 
      In this chapter, I suggest that, although characteristically liberal market economies 
like the United Kingdom have shifted to more individualistic and contractual relations, 
typically coordinated market economies like Germany have shifted from mutually 
reinforcing relationships, and distinctively dirigiste economies like France have changed 
from state mediated to state-enhanced. Owing to the fact that the academic literature of 
corporate governance is comprehensive about the dissimilarities between liberalism and 
corporatism, here I make mention of Britain and Germany simply to direct attention to 
the more substantial debate on France as another alternative. I concentrate on France 
inasmuch as it is representative of economic dirigisme in Europe, but also speak of other 
previously centralized governments as necessary to illustrate that the present situation in 
France is not unparalleled. I start with a description of France’s interventionist 
administration in comparison with the two other variants of corporate governance and the 
current trends for further internationalization and European federalization. I subsequently 
make an effort to describe the transformation over the last twenty years in the French 
political economy, and the part of the government, in French public enterprises and 
money management, and in industrial relations and organizational operations. I also draw 
a few conclusions on the prospective capital structures in modern Europe. 
      Economic strategies were at variance between European states after the war. The 
Anglo-Saxon financial capitalism or spectator government of Britain was not deeply 
involved in corporate governance (Grant, 1995). It attempted to diminish its 
responsibility to deciding by arbitration and delegated the application of the regulations 
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to sovereign groups, although this did not prevent it from making provisions to 
businesses for a particular purpose and occasionally coming in as an extraneous factor, 
with the help of state sponsored organizations (Hall, 1986). The Rhenish network-
oriented capitalism or enabling government of Germany was centred on sustaining 
companies by way of money granted to keep down the price of commodities, 
encouragement for work directed towards the innovation, introduction, and improvement 
of products and services, and assigned the administering of the regulations to social 
partners (Katzenstein, 1989). The state-led capitalism or dirigiste government of France, 
in comparison, made an effort to manage the economy by means of nationalized firms, 
and employment programmes e.g. youth employment schemes for out-of-employment 
and low-skilled young adults, on-the-job training schemes, payroll tax subsidies for 
minimum wage workers, as well as all the methods the other countries used to provide for 
enterprises, and handed over the application of the guidelines and regulations to 
government officials (Fougère et al. 2000; Hayward, 1973). 
Table 1: Characteristics of the Post-War Varieties of Capitalism by the end of the Eighties 
 
 Market capitalism 
(Britain) 
Managed capitalism 
(Germany) 
State capitalism 
(France) 
Policies toward business 
 
Liberal  
Arbitrator 
Enabling 
Facilitator 
Interventionist 
Director 
Policies toward labour 
 
Bystander Bystander Organizer 
Inter-firm relations 
 
Competitive 
Contractual 
Co-operative 
Mutually reinforcing 
State led 
State mediated 
Investment sources 
 
Capital markets Banks State 
Time horizons 
 
Short-term view Long-term view Medium-term view 
Goals 
 
Profits Firm value National political 
economic priorities 
Management-labour 
relations 
Adversarial Co-operative Adversarial 
Wage Bargaining 
 
Fragmented Co-ordinated State controlled 
 
Source: Schmidt, 2003. 
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      The management-labour relationship in Europe was correspondingly heterogeneous. 
In neo-liberal Britain, the relationship between management and workers involved 
conflict or opposition and the organization of negotiations was mostly disintegrated. This 
subsequently gave rise to a large amount of dispute and controversy on remuneration. As 
a result, though the spectator government perceived its part as unitarist or voluntarist on 
the arbitration of settlements, this did not prevent it from occasionally interfering in 
payment systems when the national currency was devalued or from reaching economic 
agreements and adopting income policies in an unsuccessful effort to harmonize 
remuneration (Edwards, 1995). In neo-corporatist Germany, on the contrary, the 
relationship between employers and employees was collaborative and negotiating was 
integrated with powerful, organized social partners. This eliminated contention and 
encouraged cooperative attitudes. The enabling government, what is more, continued to 
be in great measure a facilitator to such an affair not only because, as opposed to Britain, 
it was not necessary to interfere, considering payment systems, but also for the reason 
that its common law was quite dissimilar not just from Britain but also from other 
coordinated market economies like Holland or Belgium, where officials negotiated with 
executives and unionists as equals (Thelen, 2001). In state-led France, in comparison, the 
relationship between management and workers was as oppositional as in Britain, but 
managers’ organizations and labour institutions, were well organized. However, instead 
of functioning as a spectator, the dirigiste government made provisions for negotiations 
and enforced arrangements on remuneration when employers and employees were not 
able to strike a deal, therefore directed payment systems and handled controversy more 
efficiently than Britain but not as readily as Germany (Howell, 1992). 
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      The dissimilarities in the three versions of corporate governance may well be 
attributed not only to organizational inherent characteristics which stem from 
inconsistencies in the industrialized economies since World War II but also to national 
trajectories. The circumstances contributing to these results comprise the diversity of 
susceptibility to worldwide and European financial trends, the parliaments’ ability to 
introduce amendments in coordinated market economies, with institutions based on 
general agreement like Germany, or to enforce them, in unitarist societies with 
organizations founded on collective opinion like Britain or France, and the incremental 
adjustments that augmented parliaments’ capability to introduce emendations by 
convincing the people not just of the indispensability of transformation but also of its 
relevance with regard to nationwide standards (Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000). The table 
demonstrates the organizational change that took place in the three countries as a result of 
national trajectories. 
Table 2: Changes in Varieties of Capitalism by the end of the Nineties 
 
 Market capitalism 
(Britain) 
Managed capitalism 
(Germany) 
State capitalism 
(France) 
Policies toward business 
 
More liberal 
More arbitrator 
Still enabling 
Still facilitator 
Newly enhancing 
More liberal 
Policies toward labour 
 
More of a bystander Still bystander Newly bystander, 
moralizer 
Inter-firm relations 
 
More Competitive, 
contractual 
Still co-operative but 
loosening of networks 
Competitive, end of 
state mediation 
Investment sources 
 
Capital markets Firm, Banks, Capital 
markets 
Firm, capital markets 
Time horizons 
 
Shorter-term view Less longer-term view Less medium-term view 
Goals 
 
Shareholder values Stakeholder values Firm autonomy 
Management-labour 
relations 
Neutral Still co-operative Neutral 
Wage bargaining 
 
Radically decentralized Still co-ordinated Radically decentralized 
 
Source: Schmidt, 2003. 
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      Early in the eighties the Mitterrand regime attempted to strengthen financial contest 
by reinforcing the dirigiste administrational centralism via a comprehensive plan of 
takeovers and reforms, prior to organizing the partial withdrawal of the state from the 
management of organizations and the guidance of trade unions, by the late eighties. 
Governments following one after another performed this duty by way of economic 
emancipation, removing restrictions from companies and denationalization, and industrial 
relations reorganization. The good results were on account of their ability to enforce 
amendments in the absence of strong opposition, and they were assisted by strategies to 
win over the most afflicted sectors during the eighties and a conversion that addressed the 
inevitability of renovation surfaced by a financial emergency and its suitability with 
reference to countrywide principles (Schmidt, 2002). With incremental adjustments, they 
metamorphosed the government, which shifted from a mediating part to an enhancing 
character. In this manner, although the state aimed at the formation and safeguarding of 
fiscal organizations and the increase in the authority of firms, just like Britain, it 
sustained the interventionist policies in an effort to protect the workers from  the risk of 
the Stock Exchange, and also made an effort to move closer to the German model of 
managed capitalism. 
      Deregulation, denationalization, and industrial relations delegation, thoroughly 
transformed the nature of the French government, by diminishing its mediating strategy 
mechanisms that coincided with the enfranchisement of fiscal institutions which extended 
the autonomy of firms by making provisions for extra money resources. Furthermore, 
European Union directives that held in check governmental subsidies to enterprises also 
restrained the parliament. In spite of less centralization, the government did not 
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completely stop to exercise power on companies or employees, when it was deemed 
necessary. 
      There are three fields in particular where the government has taken an important part 
as an employer, France spent 9.5% of Gross Domestic Product for the National Health 
Service, and spent another 7.1% of GDP for education and government (INSEE, 2001). 
There are also three determinants which can provide for an interpretation of the 
continuity of its effect, the large national revenue, its part in the appointment of general 
managers in most of the state owned enterprises in which it remains a major shareholder, 
and the more than five million workers either employed by the government or whose 
salaries are paid by the state. Even though it depends on the way we measure it the 
government was the employer of between twenty per cent and twenty five per cent of 
more than twenty five million working people in France at the turn of the century 
(Jefferys, 2003). Such a large figure demonstrates clearly that it is an influential power 
which makes it hard to disregard. 
      Regardless of the discrepancies and irregularities between the three large European 
nations, the argument is that like in other parts of the continent during the post war years 
an explicit model emerged which was a hybrid of democratic liberalism and developed 
capitalism also combined with state intervention in political and socioeconomic affairs 
(Carpenter and Jefferys, 2000). It was a more restrained variety of capitalism in 
comparison with the United States of America, operating in a political landscape where 
economic and social policies varied from pure non intervention, self interested 
liberalization and government interference to absolute dirigisme (Whiteside and Salais, 
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1998). This political and socioeconomic environment in the post war era was to become 
known as the Western European variety of capitalism.       
      Of great significance are the dissimilarities in shareholding. In Britain, shareholders 
are scattered, and are composed predominantly of smaller buyers and families, at fifty 
percent and thirty percent of all holdings in the Stock Exchange for each separately in the 
late nineties. In Germany, contrastingly, shareholders are more consolidated with most of 
the holdings controlled by large blocks instead of small buyers, fifty-seven percent to 
thirty-five percent at the turn of the century (Vitols, 2001). France has almost identical 
rates and proportions, and a slightly larger congregation of institutional investors in 
manufacturing industries and other enterprises than Germany not to mention Britain, 
fifty-eight percent as opposed to forty-two percent correspondingly in the late nineties 
(Jurgens et al. 2000). Though this consolidation in shareholding has been on the 
downgrade in both nations, it still persists as important. 
      The main reason for mergers and acquisitions has not naturally been to satisfy the 
shareholders, that becomes clear by evidence which demonstrates that a number of 
successful enterprises are still owned and controlled by the government, for instance, 
France Télécom, or owned by institutional investors, such as, Axa, Cap Gemini, and 
Moet Hennessy Luis Vuitton (O’Sullivan, 2001). By contrast, one of the determining 
factors of mergers and acquisitions is competition strains for higher productivity, which 
is usually incorporated in the general objectives of enterprises and is given priority over 
shareholder value (Hancké, 2001). 
      That is not to say, nevertheless, that the discussion on shareholder value is simply 
cheap talk. Shareholder value is definitely a determinant of chief executives’ policies, but 
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not the most important one. Chief executives often have to attach special prominence on 
direct investment. When their firms are quoted on the Paris Bourse, they are actually 
exposed to up and downs in stock valuations, which can be confirmed by the difficulties 
of Alcatel and Vivendi recently. And they are also susceptible to unwanted mergers and 
acquisitions as French shareholders are not as dependable as German shareholders, that is 
endorsed by the effort of BNP to acquire Paribas and Société Générale, that eventually 
captured only Paribas. This clarifies not only the debate on shareholder value but also the 
necessity to build up reliability. 
      The dissimilarities in production systems are explained by the disparity of workplace 
relations. Germany has the largest number of jobs in manufacturing and the smallest in 
servicing among the three nations, Britain the reverse, with France nearest to Britain on 
manufacturing and servicing jobs (OECD, 2000). What is more, Germany steadily ranks 
high, France at a halfway point and Britain low with regard to contractual or 
constitutional job security, duration of agreements and settlements, and standards of 
occupational practicing (IMD, 2000). It is only in numbers of jobs that Britain does better 
than Germany or France. During the eighties and the nineties Britain halted the relative 
declines in GDP per capita and labour productivity that had characterized earlier decades, 
and partially closed the gap in income per capita with France and Germany, these gains 
were mainly attributable to relative rises in employment and hours, unlike its EU 
competitors, Britain was to able to achieve high employment-population rates with rising 
real wages for workers (Card and Freeman, 2002). 
      In France, in particular, the large degree of job security, strengthened by long term 
contracts and money invested in research and development, supports a capital structure of 
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adjusted productivity, or flexible Fordism, founded on high skillfulness, remuneration 
and efficiency. France’s employment relationship, as a result, is distinct from that of 
British financial capitalism and German co-ordinated capitalism with respect to the 
character of employees, the versatility of managers or the part of the government in 
providing for regulation (Schmidt, 2003). 
      Productivity, nevertheless, increased not just as a consequence of retraining but also 
of downscaling, with several big companies making good use of state-sponsored 
voluntary redundancy schemes to regenerate their staff. Enterprises also reduced the size 
of their workforce and extended their versatility by an expansion in secondary contracts 
via the export of manufactured commodities. Furthermore, companies also made good 
use of the mid eighties legislation on collective bargaining to advance the employment 
relationship and union incorporation into entrepreneurial functions by means of 
communication mechanisms, where France is first in Europe, and utilized the thirty-five 
hours work time to facilitate versatility (Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000). 
      France has faired very well in customarily state-controlled industries like phone 
companies, energy sources, railways, and airlines, where structural modernization has 
come as a result of state-sponsored, grand projects in which there is coordination of chief 
executives and the government concentrated on technological innovation (Amable and 
Hancké, 2001). In other sectors, nevertheless, such as medicines, organizational change 
has come from abroad, in particular from American multinational corporations (Cantwell 
and Kotecha, 1997). The statistical data on the allocation of US franchises speaks for 
itself. While France’s portion of American franchises related to technological 
development in the United States has become three times as large since the eighties and 
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the nineties, from about 9% to around 33%, in Germany they expanded to a small extent, 
from about 14% to around 20%, far less than in France. The United Kingdom, compared 
to the other two countries, was at about 47% in the eighties and the nineties, and has gone 
up to around 55%. (Schmidt, 2003). But, to whatever manner French companies may 
have advanced against the British and the Germans, according to the evidence presented 
above, they cannot be a match for the Americans who are the pioneers of this 
technological innovation (Amable et al. 1997). 
      French enterprises are nowadays more independent than either the network-oriented 
German or market-oriented British companies, not to mention the state-mediated French 
enterprises of the recent past, but the French privatizations process did not entail a sharp 
departure of the previous model as they generated a cross-shareholding system in which 
the state still exerted an influence, therefore, the French industrial system knows a lot of 
restructuring that will induce numerous changes (Bancel, 1999; Schmidt, 2003). French 
enterprises are more open to the Stock Exchange than German companies, because of the 
number of stockholders from overseas, and more integrated than British enterprises due 
to a management aristocracy. In spite of the partial withdrawal of the government, France 
continues to have a more powerful administration than Britain where the government 
works basically to safeguard the financial institutions, or Germany, where the 
administration attempts to defend non-profit organizations. In France, the government 
persists in interference, although in a more restricted manner, with low taxation policies, 
by way of rules and regulations designed for making the market more competitive and 
seeks to moralize companies and industrial relations, notwithstanding that, many times its 
mediation has helped to liberalize the socioeconomic environment. What is more, France 
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in comparison with Germany and Britain is defined by organizational operations founded 
on relatively high expertise, earnings, and service range, with a larger productivity and 
efficiency than the Germans and better skillfulness than the British, and with a greater 
ability than Germany for technological development, especially in previously state-
controlled industries, and than Britain for structural modernization. 
 
A Changing Role for the Paris Bourse 
 
      Current discussion on business management mostly derives from the 
acknowledgement of the importance of large firms for the prosperity of a society. In 
many countries big companies have a significant part in formulating political 
developments because of deciding on issues like spending, industrial relations and 
commerce. In other words, the procedure followed in the allocation of resources has a 
great impact on the prosperousness of a society in general. Corporate management relates 
to the practices which affect the allocation of revenues and resources by organizations. In 
particular, the network of business management determines who decides in investing in 
corporations, what is the amount of spending, and how these revenues are allocated 
(O’Sullivan, 2000). 
      Although current debate has originated a number of distinct powerful theories on the 
determinants of structures of corporate management, the connection between those 
doctrines and available facts is very unclear. It turns out that, these viewpoints are 
supported without any proof other than what skeptics define as bald assertion (Branson, 
2001). In some occasions, only the most imprecise points are asserted to back up those 
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doctrines. Illustrating this general rule is the assertion of the supremacy of shareholder 
value networks of business management which is founded upon contentions for large 
scale economic factors like production per unit in the late part of the nineties. To the 
degree that comprehensive statistical data is displayed, it is usually to clarify well-defined 
nationwide trajectories of transformation in structures of corporate management like the 
trend for companies in Europe to be quoted on stock exchanges in the United States. 
      The substantial participation of the French state in the proprietorship and 
administration of firms is commonly perceived as one of the major characteristics in the 
economy of France. The state’s full engagement with the management of companies 
which were most important for the French society started out after the war when several 
firms were made national. A variety of companies were selected by this programme. 
Firms making provisions for the structural foundations of entrepreneurship, were 
considered as essential for the restoration, and progress of the French society, and were 
nationalized. Companies owned by groups actively opposing, or hostile to the cause, and 
by the Vichy administration, also had to pass to the management of new employers. 
      The Second World War had a significant part in the formation of the French variety 
of capitalism and government intervention. The Vichy Government via its chief 
administrative officers directed the levels of wages, and demanded that all workers take 
part in the corporatist organizational structure related to their sector. The Work Charter 
that was enacted during the war required that in all places with more than one hundred 
employees a Works Social Committee should be founded with the manager to be in a 
position of authority as the chairperson, but was formed of delegates of both employers 
and employees (Frémy and Frémy, 2000; Jefferys, 2003).  
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      It is possible that the main incentive for the government’s part as a proprietor of 
equity in France was to a certain extent the conviction that the families directing the 
economic activity of the French society in the past were impeding progress. Nevertheless, 
French upper classes were convinced that a change in business proprietorship would not 
be enough for socioeconomic recovery. Additional measures had to be taken, it was 
contended, to improve France’s mechanical arts and applied sciences for the economy 
and the society to recover. In an effort to accomplish this task, the French state adopted a 
wide range of courses of action for the renovation and advance of the country. One of the 
most significant means of exerting influence was its participation in French money 
resources. The government also proposed a broad spectrum of principles of action for the 
refurbishment of France’s research and development foundations and, in revising what is 
defined as the national system of innovation (Amable, et al. 1997). 
      An important outcome of this interference in the economic affairs was not only secure 
fiscal management of the distribution of revenues but also a strong reliance by French 
corporations on loans for subsidizing their activities. Scholars gave an account of the 
circumstances in a review of the interrelationship of the transactions of banks, the public 
money, and the assets of organizations in France. 
Until the mid-1980s, the capital structure of French firms, compared to other countries, was 
heavily biased towards bank financing. Moreover, the banking system was at the core of the 
financial economy, operating, taken as a whole, as the agent of monetary, credit, and industrial 
policies and forming a cohesive unit under the direction of the Banque de France. (Bertero, 
1994) 
      The most remarkable characteristic of governmental engagement in France with 
money management immediately after the war was the degree to which it was 
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accomplished with the collaboration of the powerful or influential persons. As 
commentators observed, one of the most effective instruments of this near symbiosis 
between a State apparatus receptive to the arguments of oligopolistic industry and large 
firms marked by the reflex of turning to the State for support has been the system of elite 
production through the grandes écoles (Chesnais, 1993). As a consequence, French big 
companies, firms which were made national, and other organizations have been 
administered by managers with comparable expertise. In the nineties, fifty per cent of the 
Présidents Directeurs Généraux of the one hundred biggest corporations in France 
obtained qualifications from distinguished French universities, the École Polytechnique 
and the École National d’Administration, in comparison with thirty-five per cent in the 
eighties. Most of France’s chief executives arrived at the highest point of private 
companies after spells in public firms. Because of denationalizations, the significance of 
the State as the origin of Présidents Directeurs Généraux enhanced and, in the mid 
nineties forty-five per cent in the two hundred biggest organizations of the private sector 
as opposed to forty per cent in the mid eighties were former government officials (Bauer 
and Bertin-Mourot, 1995). 
      When the Socialists came to power, worried about the absence of works councillors 
from the decision making in French corporations, made an effort to reform the French 
employment relationship, with the enactment of the Auroux Laws. This legislation, 
applied to every firm with more than two hundred workers, reinforced the 
communication and conference power of comités d’entreprise, and also instructed that 
chief executives and trade unionists bargain in a certain way. The Auroux Laws were a 
significant driving force for the transfer of authority from the central to the company 
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level on the basis of greater local autonomy. With regard to the reorganization of 
negotiations, nevertheless, unionists underwent a decrease in membership, and did not 
succeed in the formation of a strategy of employee involvement. The estimated average 
annual trade union membership between the seventies and the eighties decreased from 
about four and a half million to around three million (Jefferys, 1996). 
      In the early nineties, it was evident that the infrastructure of business management 
was transformed to such a degree that the consistency of the French variant of capitalism 
was in dispute. What was going to substitute this network, nevertheless, was unclear. 
However, the existence of a solid structure of cross-shareholdings which connected 
French firms to one another appeared to be a large obstacle to a conversion to the Anglo-
Saxon model. 
      For some scholars, the relaxation of the French cross-holding relations was the 
important course of action which made the French model to shift toward the Anglo-
Saxon variant of corporate governance (O’Sullivan, 2003). It made less difficult the fast 
expansion of speculators from abroad to the French financial markets. By the late 
nineties, international proprietorship amounted to thirty-five per cent in comparison with 
ten per cent during the eighties. In big French companies, financiers from overseas 
accounted for even more. At the turn of the century, foreigners controlled the ownership 
of about fifty per cent of Elf, forty-five per cent of Société Générale, and around forty per 
cent of AGF, Alcatel and Générale des Eaux (Morin, 2000). 
      An important device in the intercourse of the Stock Exchange and the business 
management in France was the increased utilization of dividends in the determination of 
wage levels. The significance of dividend yields in France, augmented since the early 
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half of the eighties and, during the late part of the nineties. Indeed, evidence summoned 
for the years 1999 and 2000 by the French corporate journal, L’Expansion, on 
organizations which are quoted on the CAC40 display that France’s biggest corporations 
were number one in Europe and, at a worldwide level, second only to organizations in the 
United States, in terms of dividends paid by corporations to shareholders. At a European 
level, big companies in Germany were a distant second to the French firms and the gap 
between the two nations was huge with French shareholders’ dividend yields of much 
greater value than German stocks (O’Sullivan, 2001). 
      Another technique of intertwining corporate governance with wage levels was shares 
held by employees. As stated by the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études 
Économiques, worker shareholdings accounted for about seven hundred thousand, even 
though other sources state that this value underrated the real magnitude of workforce 
holdings in France. In agreement with an evaluation by L’Expansion of the CAC40 
enterprises, one million workers were holding shares valued at FF157bn in the financial 
year 1999-2000. In the class of the CAC40 businesses, the amount of workforce 
proprietorship was largest in Société Générale, something that attracted special 
prominence granted the significant part that shares hold by employees had in resisting a 
leveraged buyout by BNP (O’Sullivan, 2003). 
      This enquiry makes evident that the character of the Stock Exchange in French 
business management has been reformed to a great extent. In fact, for many scholars its 
augmentation was the distinctive part of the nouveau capitalisme français. Conceding that 
the Stock Exchange has recently come to be more influential in the French economy, it is 
still not as powerful as the financial markets of the United States, and the United 
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Kingdom. For instance, France had eight hundred indigenous companies approved for 
dealings on the bourse at the turn of the century which was a large improvement on the 
sum of six hundred during the eighties but this was way below America and Britain. 
What is more, shareholding was consolidated and focused in France as opposed to the 
United States and the United Kingdom where the small investors continued to exercise 
influence on a variety of firms (Bloch and Kremp, 2001). 
      It is widely accepted that the Stock Exchange adds to the effectiveness of company 
assets distribution by way of making funds easily accessible to large firms. Although this 
opinion is standard, nevertheless, its underlying principle is weak. In a research article in 
the journal of Financial Economics about Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital 
scholars attached special importance to our false impression of those topics not only for 
the Stock Exchange but for the economy on the whole. 
A fundamental job of the economy is to allocate capital efficiently. To achieve this, capital is 
supposed to be invested in the sectors that are expected to have high returns and be withdrawn 
from sectors with poor prospects. For a long time and for many reasons, economists have 
suspected that formal financial markets and associated institutions improve the capital allocation 
process and thus contribute to economic growth. Despite this body of theory, there is little direct 
evidence on whether and how financial markets improve the allocation of capital.  (Wurgler, 
2000) 
The hypothesis that the stock Exchange underpins an effectual allotment of revenues in 
the society has come to be unsustainable, at least as a statement that is subject to proof, 
considering trends in shares bought and sold. To the degree that the Stock Exchange is 
disposed to egotism in the estimation of stocks, the influence that small investors may be 
anticipated to exert on company assets distribution is essentially decreased. Chief 
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executives often have the capacity to profit from a favourable circumstance by readily 
obtaining lump sums of money. 
      Besides, there is a lack of evidence that the uprising of mergers and acquisitions 
which burst forth in European countries recently, has been a manifestation of investor 
control of the financial markets. To start with, a small number of offers that were 
proclaimed in France or Germany were hostile, an attitude which is generally thought to 
be related to management discipline. What is more, it is unclear that the hostile offers 
which have been made were prompted by mismanagement in any of those firms. In fact, 
financial analysts have for a long while strived to prove the argument that shareholder 
power has an effect on the authority of administration. 
      In some sectors, a period of prosperity in commerce during the nineties, gave birth to 
a large number of high tech businesses in France and Germany, the new owners were 
fascinated by the idea of passing into possession of highly valued enterprises like Alcatel, 
Cisco, Lucent, and Nortel. However, the efforts made by a corporation such as Lucent to 
pass or change from an old economy to a new economy organization have caused it to be, 
as a result of the financial markets failure, in a declining position. What is of special 
prominence in the growth and downturn of the Stock Exchange, is the concentration of 
high tech companies upon maximizing shareholder value, that has inspired them to spend 
on progressively slim and focused expertise of qualified staff, and by means of exporting 
most of their mass production operations, to stop making arrangements for jobs, and 
vocational training, for employees of low education, and skills. 
      An explanation why the reformation was plausible in France is that trade unionists 
were not able to restrain it taking into account the decreased membership and the small 
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part of employee delegates in decision making. Most significantly, nevertheless, was that 
in spite of opposition from some sections there was a majority view in circles of French 
politicians and chief executives that big companies had to be drastically reformed if they 
wanted to subsist in an international economy (O’Sullivan, 2003; Smith, 1998). That is to 
say, the manifestation of politics was very much determined by financial affairs. 
      In this part I have made an effort to demonstrate, for the case study of France, that a 
long established network of business management has gone through a number of 
alterations. Possibly the most impressive of these adaptations that recently took place in 
France, particularly in the late part of the nineties was the enlargement of the scale of 
commercial operations of the Stock Exchange. Although the French variety of capitalism 
continues to be distinct from the political economy in the United States with regard to the 
weightiness of the stock market, the increase of its influence has been substantial from a 
historical point of view. 
 
Flexible Fordism in a Symmetrical Relationship 
 
      This section calls into question one of the general notions about transformation. A 
wide range of opinions is based on the concept that France is trapped in a complex 
network for the reason that it has been unable to remodel its institutional framework. 
Current publications on organizational change, nevertheless, indicate that trust, brought 
about the formation of harmonious relations among big companies and their distributors, 
which are the foundations of an original structure (Hancké, 2003). 
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      In their quest for versatility, the big exporters in France pursued their way along a 
track that goes further than the old network of workplace relations, and some incremental 
adjustments in corporate governance. Nonetheless, it was not only the rationality of chief 
executives that paved the way for those enterprises, some of them resorted to current 
management practices on local financial affairs for the formation of an alternative 
relationship with their distributors, one of the aspects that was critical for radical change. 
      As French business had improved on manufacturing goods which were not as 
competitive in a global environment, the barriers to regulation should have increased and 
resulted in a number of difficulties for the French model. Indicators on macroeconomic 
factors, nevertheless, are rather favourable, not including the amount of new jobs, that 
has steadily been less than the OECD standard, the French capitalist economy in the time 
after the nineties has been comparable to, and in several occasions better than its 
counterparts. The statistics exhibited below, which are percentages of large scale factors 
at the turn of the century, display a fairly advantageous situation for the French variant. 
Table 3: Economic Performance Averages 
 
 GDP  
growth 
Inflation Unemployment Productivity 
growth 
Investment 
% of GDP 
Exports  
% of GDP 
France 
 
2.4 1.3 10.4 1.5 2.0 24.7 
Germany 
 
1.7 1.4 7.3 2.5 1.2 27.1 
Italy 
 
1.9 2.9 9.8 1.5 2.9 26.3 
UK 
 
2.8 2.8 9.5 1.7 5.6 27.6 
USA 
 
4.1 2.5 6.3 1.6 9.9 9.1 
Canada 
 
3.6 1.8 9.6 0.8 7.2 40.5 
Japan 
 
1.3 0.2 2.5 0.6 -0.4 10.4 
 
Source: OECD, 2000. 
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      Following as a result of this stage of growth and advancement in the economy of 
France in the post-war years, distributors had begun to rely on big companies. The 
delegation strategies of the French state during the sixties and the seventies had 
culminated in developed, self-sufficient regions, and by the eighties, many of the 
locations of big companies had come to be the focal points of indigenous work cultures, 
in which their distributors were considered to be part of the business (Veltz, 1996). At the 
time that the big companies were restructured in the late nineties, they were 
advantageously placed in those regional industries, which helped them to determine the 
level and course of adaptation. Besides, the relationship among big companies and their 
distributors was based on consistency. As opposed to manufacturing commodities in such 
a manner that they depended on the competence of their distributors in providing 
services, and accommodating themselves to the needs and requirements of local 
production systems, the big exporters regarded their commodities as accumulations of a 
coordinated systematic range of services (Casper, 1997). The revision of commodity 
improvement, accordingly both strengthened, and was underpinned by, the present 
orderly structure of local distribution systems. 
      As a consequence of those regional strategies, big companies established new zones 
of employment in remote French areas, which is confirmed by the table below. Although 
this was partly associated with the expensive workers in Paris and the surrounding lands, 
some enterprises had settled well before the nineties in the outlying districts for their own 
reasons, for example Peugeot placed its most significant workshops in the eastern parts of 
the countryside, Michelin was situated in the interior part close to Clermont-Ferrand, the 
aviation technology was based in the western territories near Toulouse and Bordeaux 
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after a political resolution was reached to position this sector a long distance off the 
German frontier (Aniello and Le Galés, 2001). Therefore, manufacturing in France 
gradually adopted a delegated framework of organizational operations, even though the 
decentralized structure was usually a strategy for big companies to succeed in avoiding 
aggressive employees, workplace relations disintegration or capacity limitations. 
Table 4: Distribution of Large Firms per Travel-to-Work Area 
 
Percentage  of Large Firms Total Zones of Employment 
39 82 
22 46 
20 42 
10 21 
9 19 
100 210 
 
Source: SESSI, 2003. 
      The data by the Service des Études et Statistiques Industrielles makes evident that the 
influence of the big companies is not an exceptional occasion that applies to a number of 
regions, but it is a comprehensive network which serves as an explanation for how the 
enterprises exercised command over the districts. Owing to the fact that large workshops 
of big companies exercised authority all over the French regions, and inasmuch as the 
small suppliers were more or less unimportant, the local strategies of the enterprises, met 
with success. In the regional sectors, they were the foundation stones for the 
rearrangement of the factories of big companies. All the way through this procedure, 
economic transformation in France in recent years continued along a big company route 
to versatility, which integrated formerly present organizational frameworks with 
innovative, versatile structures of corporate relations. 
      The allocation of resources set in motion the active organization of the formerly 
stagnant local distribution systems. In comparison with the years gone by, when 
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distributors were considered basically as agents for solving regional difficulties, they 
started to have a main part in big companies’ quest for versatility after the eighties. An 
experimental test of efficiency in production was the implementation of total quality 
management. At this stage, Renault began to use KanBan schedules, and other big 
companies conformed to its actions (Labbé, 1992). By the nineties, all sectors where 
some kind of just in time delivery was utilized, like automobiles, computers, and 
machinery, were getting into a different relationship with their distributors (Gorgeu and 
Mathieu, 1993). Due to the fact that lean manufacturing necessitated the restructuring of 
local production systems if enterprises wanted to avoid the extra expenses of goods in 
stock, it was clear that their success was contingent on the ability of the distributors to 
restructure and deal with those demands. 
      The background of the French political economy is defined by state interventionism, 
and public subsidies, and as recently as the eighties, the government was the most 
important player in French monetary affairs. There was an increased apprehension, as a 
result, that big companies would not be able to reestablish themselves. Considering the 
events of former years, in reality, it was beyond doubt that the restructuring of the 
economy should be expected to occur via the government (Cohen, 1989). With the 
purpose of moving out of the unreliable and obsolete network in which they were stuck, 
ever since the French style of Fordist manufacturing, ceased to be the dominant model 
the enterprises required more than incremental adjustment (Hancké, 2003; Howell, 1992). 
      Ultimately, the rectifications involved, in addition to an expansion of the standard 
economic assistance to large firms, a local distribution framework, visualized as the 
pendant of nationwide corporate strategies, which realized far-reaching objectives in a 
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number of regions. The tactics attempted to stimulate inventiveness on account of the 
diffusion of consultation and the advance of mechanical arts. Institutes of applied 
sciences were established or renovated, and the Ministry of Industry delegated some of its 
functions via administrative departments such as the ADEPA, ANVAR, and DRIRE 
(Levy, 1999). Moreover, local administration assisted the exports of big companies, the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Direction de l’Industrie, de la Recherche et de 
l’Environment were the principal agents in this effort (Greffe, 1992). Besides, the 
structure of vocational education was evenly decentralized, permitting the areas to adjust 
the central network to regional requirements. Moreover, subsequent to the economic 
reorganization of the eighties, an endeavour was made to optimize the management of 
resources and bring institutional investors close to under-funded small and medium 
enterprises (Chanel-Reynaud and Cieply, 1996). Additionally, the association of the 
districts with the government was authorized by means of written or spoken agreements, 
integrating territorial and national aspirations. 
      The case study of Renault, illustrates that the firm regenerated its assets by improving 
the relations with distributors, and most of its workshops gained influence in the districts. 
Although Renault arranged this on its own, the refurbishment of the local distribution 
systems would have been more difficult with no powerful subcontractors (Freyssenet, 
1998). The industry directions, like the Délégation à l’aménagement du Territoire et de 
l’action Régionale and administrative departments such as the MIRE, were activated by 
Renault to provide technical innovation for the distributors. Apart from this, Renault 
devised a control mechanism, which carefully monitored how the most significant 
distributors were operating and enforced strict rules and regulations upon them (Hancké, 
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2003). This fusion of intrinsic and extrinsic strategies permitted Renault to strengthen its 
local production systems in the regions and ask for both technological and managerial 
qualities from its distributors. In due course, Renault distributors were verified in 
conformity with the ISO 9000 requirements and specifications. 
      The analysis of state-controlled business such as the Electricité de France indicates 
that they depended on local revenues provided by the government for their own 
organizational modernizatrion. With regard to its business associates, EDF exercised its 
monopolistic influence to support them, and was capable to count entirely upon the 
increased jurisdiction conferred to it by the state. Specialized requirements were defined 
by the firm via AFNOR the industry direction, and other specifications via AFAQ the 
administrative department (Hancké, 1998). In this way, the company improved the 
technological and managerial abilities of its partners quickly, so that they were capable of 
meeting the specialized requirements enforced on them by the firm. What is more, 
because some of its plants had developed into self-determined units in mostly agricultural 
territories after the company’s reorganization, its growing importance in the economy 
obliged the government to take into account its strong effect (Duclos and Mauchamp, 
1994). The firm brought into effective action its own revenues, and focused upon areas of 
special expertise, in cooperation with the state. Consequently, the company had the 
capacity to enforce stringent rules and regulations on its distributors such as the RTE, 
who acts as an independent administrator of infrastructure, and GDF Services, a 
subsidiary of Gaz de France, and assisted them to comply with them. 
      Some important arguments flow from this assessment. The suggestions apply to the 
essence of the economic aspects of government. Not long ago, any interpretation of 
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organizational change in France embraced the concept of a state which exercised control 
over the financial affairs, e.g. Steve Jefferys in his book liberté, égalité and fraternité  
argues that in spite of the growing significance of non French stock ownership the 
government remains at the centre of capital management. Although it is debatable now 
that this argument was probably an overstatement, its lasting legacy provides for an 
analytical tool for the explanation of the recent developments. To comprehend the part of 
the government in organizational transformation in France during the last twenty years 
we have to differentiate between dynamic and flexible strategies. It is for certain that the 
state still has a significant part in France as a consequence of its health and pension 
systems, voluntary redundancy schedules, reduction of working hours, modification of 
payment schemes, and technical innovation, and the government provides for the 
underpinning of financial and managerial regulation (Trumbull, 2001). Nevertheless, the 
dynamic policy, the centralized steering of monetary affairs that has customarily been 
related to the French variant, is not any more the responsibility of the government. By 
contrast a flexible plan of action was adopted, the state retreated and the leadership 
passed on to the big companies, which are now the main actors (Hancké, 2002). 
      Big exporters, nevertheless, did not only translate ideas into actions, in spite of the 
shortage of organizational reserves and established networks that helped the West of 
Germany and the South of England to progress, French companies all the same succeeded 
in the construction of an effective design. By pronouncing transfer of powers from a 
central to a local authority and intimate relations with distributors, the determinants of 
prosperity in the other states, within the current orderly and concentrated French variety 
of capitalism, enterprises combined different policies. As a result nations which are not 
The Reform of Corporate Governance in France 28 
furnished with a solid regional infrastructure may well be capable of organizational 
efficiency. This is another way to economic versatility. 
 
Radical Taylorism by the Regulation Theory 
 
      Taylorist modes of operation have transformed the character of industrial relations as 
well as the socioeconomic participation of the majority of workers. Instead of a rejection 
by employees, Taylorism, evolved into one of the keywords for scientific management. 
Tending to the opposite of an autocratic and low expertise structure, it was meant to 
provide partnership and security (Taylor, 2006). It focused on the moderation of 
workplace controversy via the employment of sophisticated technicians, the Taylorist 
managers. The responsibilities and services of those technicians are now disregarded in 
the latest version of Taylorism. It is, nevertheless, as a consequence of their activities that 
its financial, societal and intellectual achievement can be interpreted. Unless it becomes 
clear what is important about the principles of scientific management, those who hope to 
get away from it chance the possibility of recreating it or reconstructing its undesirable 
effect that they need to avoid (Appelbaum, and Batt, 1994). This is what I describe as 
theoretical rigidity. The means of solving the problems of the late political disintegration 
are identified in a postmodern Taylorization.  
      We have to understand the complexity of such an enquiry. For the scholars it is 
difficult to build up the separate elements into a connected whole, which accepts as valid 
the general notions in respect to the diversified nature of financial interests in the 
economy. This doctrinal knowledge derives from the current ideological perception for 
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the society (Gephart, 1996). Political science is especially conscientious in several 
Anglo-American writings, this also applies to the French academic literature, e.g. the 
école de la régulation. The research into published and unpublished material on economic 
and social evolution, provides an interpretation which restructures a universal grand 
design. These writers make an effort to substitute the neo liberal doctrine with an 
employee grand design of industrial relations, and accordingly, of international 
cooperation (Besson, 2000; Schwamberger and Yami, 2000). 
      The philosophical and even radical, foundations of those scholars’ dissertations also 
demonstrate an economic determinism at the second level (Bernoux et al. 1987). As 
Gramsci is cited several times by them, a good knowledge of his writings, in which, 
directly from the original source, the general notion of Fordism is analyzed, is very 
enlightening. We find out in Gramsci an interpretation of Taylorism which is founded 
upon the idea of hegemony and which turns out to be, in some aspects, a way out of the 
theoretical rigidity of worker disempowerment propositions. 
      A detailed analysis of these dissertations helps us to comprehend the events which 
were not examined by the classical version of Taylorism. We find out organizational 
procedures which are frequently informal and distant from the alleged theoretical rigidity. 
Those findings indicate that Taylorism has not been investigated thoroughly, at least in 
France, in the absence of employment techniques at present utilized in sociology and 
ergonomy (Chouraqui, 1994).  
      A concise description of the nature of French business administration is the ability to 
adjust to diversity. The organizational operations are defined by a Taylorist approach, 
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rather than inflexible routines. The versatility and the potential for continuous progress 
and innovation are quite remarkable. 
That which we call no consensus cooperation, with many different, more precise, forms, seems 
to have been the main characteristic of the relationship between organizers, workers, and lower 
and middle management. It is to be emphasized that Taylorian organizers had no hierarchical 
responsibilities. In this sense, they were not managers. (Besson, 1996) 
      Another outcome of this study is that this collaboration was not limited to occasional 
comings and goings and other unofficial relations. The Taylorist managers respected the 
education and expertise of the employees. They included them as a factor in their 
perception of the workplace and programmes, with regard to both qualified and 
inexperienced members of staff. 
Through concrete processes of local and informal transactions, for an example into informal 
labour practices, see Finley and others, processes we term micro-negotiations, an actual 
Taylorian rule is constituted, which is not possible to simply interpret as mechanical productive 
order. (Pavé, 1993) 
      The Taylorist principle seems to be an incisive concept with clear objectives, 
concentrated on the disempowerment assumptions. Those presumptions direct attention 
to a conservative idea of authority in the workplace controversy (Boje and Rosile, 1999). 
The Taylorist practice is also focused upon dealing with dispute. It must be taken into 
account that the organizers’ attitude is not decided just by their economic-corporate 
attributes in the sense of regulation. This new design of corporate governance is built 
around a regulationist idea of economic control which is founded on the variety of 
financial interests, before anything else in big companies. This notion is articulated by the 
notion of leadership. As the case may be they are both versions which try to explain 
similar events. The idea of a brand-new variant suggests that evidence is provided 
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through interpretations as opposed to reality. Basically, reality is beyond the scope of 
political science. The socioeconomic factors are examined by analytical instruments 
which are incarnated theories (Besson, 2000). This information is as follows constructive 
explanations of our association to the real. 
      The revival of the Taylorist design is validated by the ongoing developments in 
labour institutions. Traditionally, in France trade unions have been firmly established on 
the objection to the Taylorist structure. I contend there may be a connection between the 
alleged decay of Taylorism and the weakening of labour institutions, although some 
scholars suggest that Taylorist and Neo-Taylorist principles of management persist 
(Hofstede, 1984). This linkage becomes evident now as the indifference of trade unionists 
and, in my opinion, is a turning point in the progress of workplace relationships towards a 
reformation of Taylorism. 
      In fact, the legislation introduces a procedure of distinct work-time arrangements that 
may help the conversion to a thirty-five hour schedule. This is endorsed by the 
maintenance of the distinctive structures founded in the eighties which facilitates the 
revision of the negotiation of wages by an organized body of employees, and is 
reinforced by the Robien act of the nineties. Though this does not cause an obstruction to 
the statutory framework in the employment relationship, it emphasizes that settlements 
are reached at company level. In this manner, it makes provisions for a structure of 
delegated negotiation with workers without necessarily collective representation. 
Therefore, we can evidently observe a reconsideration of the exclusive control by the 
large labour institutions. At this stage, the Aubry act makes much more easily achieved 
the decentralization of workplace relationships. 
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      A case-study of Protex is quite revealing, the quality of manufacturing had caused a 
number of restraints on organizational operations. About twelve months later, the chief 
executives attempted to reform the company’s raison d’être basically to decrease the 
duration of work-time and, besides, to comply with the requirements, in relation to 
versatility, sophistication and independence, as determined by modern HRM and the law. 
The negotiation permitted the reinforcement of work organization in relation to management 
strategic targets posed in terms of employees’ responsibility and autonomy. In this way, the new 
production-system shaping appears to be more rational and more efficient. Moreover, this 
adjustment has led to a decrease in hours worked per week and to an improvement in working 
conditions. On the whole, those concerned came out satisfied with the organizational change 
after having tried it. (Schwamberger, 1999) 
      The case-study of Typhoon is also instructive, the board of directors were favourably 
disposed towards the construction of a winner-winner arrangement at the conference on 
remuneration and work-time. Accordingly, employee delegates and works councillors 
were given tutorials on the divergent modes of operation and team work. In these 
seminars, members described a variety of topics concerning the bargaining process such 
as versatility, benefits, welfare, health services, and salary. As a consequence, a coalition 
involving three parties has been established. For one month those teams summoned every 
week and, based on their judgment, a settlement was accomplished. 
This complex mechanism allowed workflow to vary according to flexibility needs, in particular 
to the production launching. Thus the firm has succeeded in developing an ideal organizational 
structure for this new job which has led, in particular, to a significant decrease in storage costs. 
Moreover, as far as human resources are concerned, the agreement created employment and 
reduced the need for casual labour. Typhoon succeeded in stabilizing its internal staff in order to 
better develop employees’ competence and polyvalence. In this respect they are satisfied with 
the agreement. (Yami, 1999) 
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      Apart from these important outcomes, we also take notice of the decentralization in 
collective bargaining. In every occasion, chief executives express unreservedly the 
economic significance of work-time restructuring. The arbitrators find their place in the 
companies, either close to the board of directors or near the works councils and labour 
institutions. As a result, the bargaining objectives are not defined just by the chief 
executives and the employee delegates. This discussion contributes to the development of 
a new consciousness for those with a genuine interest in industrial relations. 
      The reformation appears to be an elementary and immediate shift from the 
conventional activities of the work scientific organization (Schwamberger and Yami, 
2000). Therefore, in my opinion, there is not a single method of achieving something or 
organizing the workplace relations. Nevertheless, the realignment of the procedure 
contains a work redistribution pact where every company picks the most suitable 
structure according to its circumstances. This framework is also an integral part of 
bargaining, and we notice that workers become associated with the decision-making of 
work-time restructuring. As a result, the series of stages in manufacture are not 
disconnected. Salary is not the only incentive for members of staff, the enhancement of 
the significance of their job as well is an important stimulation. Lastly, the arbitration of 
industrial relations casts doubt on the modes of operation of the old design. Nonetheless, 
we note that it is primarily an issue of moderating its adversarial nature. 
      My argument is that a French-style version of Taylorism, with its complicated and 
antagonistic character, seems to develop into a contractual model, which attaches special 
prominence on coordination and consensus. The cases presented above illustrate this 
idea. Labour institutions historically have a part in work-time and wage arrangements 
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(Guedj, and Vindt, 1997). The encouragement given by the Aubry law, enacted in the late 
nineties, offers a chance for original bargaining methods and the emergence of novel 
institutional structures. These frameworks seek to integrate Taylorian values with the 
growing demand for versatility. 
 
The Foundations of Entrepreneurial Culture 
 
      The current academic literature which attempts to interpret the emergence of the New 
Public Management or new entrepreneurialism can be defined as business-centric (Saint-
Martin, 2000). The rise of the New Public Management in business administration as 
well as of the specialists who are considered to be the social bearers of this concept, are 
commonly thought as part of a gradual evolution that was not related to the government 
but stems from the efforts of the most creative and energetic organizational 
entrepreneurs. For the reason that the New Public Management springs from merchants 
and industrialists, and because this notion has been transferred to public administration 
on the shoulders of managers coming from non-state controlled companies, the fact that 
policies are growing more entrepreneurial is attributed to a wave of privatizations. 
According to this explanation, politicians are in a greater or less degree a sleeping partner 
who usually fall behind the latest events in the non-state controlled part of the economy 
on which they exercise no great power. 
We believe TQM is the best, and perhaps the only, method government can use to meet new 
challenges. We hope this book will help promote TQM in government, because we see it as the 
best way to improve public services, and get more output for the dollar. (Coopers and Lybrand, 
1991) 
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      Based upon the general propositions advanced by historical-institutionalism, the 
interpretation provided in this part offers a somewhat state-centric description of the 
emergence of an original entrepreneurial culture since the eighties (Steinmo and Thelen, 
1992). Accordingly, it draws attention to the permeability of strategies, in an effort to 
comprehend the preceding circumstances of Total Quality Management with reference to 
the originality value of organizational change by analyzing theories traditionally found in 
production systems (Weir, 1992). The obscurity is partially ascribed to decision-makers 
in the areas of corporate governance and production systems who have a more or less 
identical view on institutional-reform practices. With regard to organizational change in 
France, this topic has become particularly significant after the designation of New Right 
politicians in the nineties, who think that nationalized firms are inferior to non-state 
controlled companies and attempt to refurbish their administration by using standard 
operating procedures of the privatized firms. As the economic and social environment 
encourages the state to become business-like, and as this philosophy minimizes the 
discrepancies between nationalized companies and non-state controlled firms, the 
distinction, both theoretical and organizational, that divides corporate governance from 
production systems has also become less evident and more obscure. And as I will 
demonstrate, this makes provisions for common policies to be adopted across the two 
disciplines and for professional advisers to assist the transference of general notions of 
Total Quality Management from the privatized companies to state controlled firms. 
      During the last twenty years, Total Quality Management has been a success story for 
business administration (Legge, 2001; Saint-Martin, 2001). The rise of Total Quality 
Management in Europe came as a result of American enthusiasm for Japanese production 
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systems which turned out to be very efficient in the international economy of the 
seventies. In later years, industrial policy was regarded as the main reason for Japan’s 
increasing productivity and, it is logically consistent that the Japanese variant of 
manufacturing started to disseminate into Western countries (Pastor et al. 1998). The 
greatest supporters of Total Quality Management were experts in engineering, they have 
been recognized as the ones who drove the process of the Japanese efficiency in assembly 
(Deming, 1982). The fundamental principle of Total Quality Management is the 
disposition of a system of maintaining standards in manufactured products by testing a 
sample of the output against the specification as a distinct operation, but making every 
worker to take the initiative. 
A broad-scale approach to changing an organization’s entire culture to focus on establishing and 
maintaining high standards of quality, especially with respect to meeting customer expectations. 
The key to TQM is to serve the customer, whether the customer is internal to the organization or 
someone outside. (Denhardt, 1991) 
 Senior specialists, and public servants, by means of formal announcements and 
communications to third parties, acted as a stimulus to Total Quality Management and 
were also the major advocates of its development in nations like France. In this country, 
decision-makers recommended Total Quality Management as the way forward to a new 
global economy.        
      Following an election based on a typically centralist or dirigiste ideology, the 
Socialist party shifted its economic strategy from Keynesian interventionism to more 
stringent management of public money, as France was adopting the policies decreed by 
the European Union in relation to the free movement of goods and services, the abolition 
of trade tariffs, the integration of capital markets, and so on (Hall, 1990). Subsequent to 
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the resignation of Prime Minister Mauroy as well as a number of Communist members of 
parliament, the French state embarked on a Great U-turn in the public administration of 
financial affairs and proposed a course of competitive disinflation to minimize revenue 
shortage, the amount of which had escalated as a result of the number of nationalized 
companies in the recent past. This change in politics heralded the dawn of a new era from 
a state led society to a more liberal one (Schmidt, 1996). 
      In the eighties, the Ministére de l’Industrie implemented a wide range of policies for 
promoting the concept of Total Quality Management. For example, the ministry 
established the Fonds régionaux d’aide aux conseils, or the Regional Funds for Aid to 
Firms Calling on Consultancy Services, to subsidize the work of smaller businesses so 
they can make use of professional advisers as a means of improving their standard 
operating procedures. As soon as it was founded, the FRAC started to assist small and 
medium enterprises by using specialists in the field of Total Quality Management. On the 
whole, forty percent of the funds donated by FRAC were destined for programmes in the 
region of Total Quality Management. In the nineties, about 3,000 claims for FRAC 
subsidy were sanctioned and approximately 175 FF mn became available for consultancy 
services and other FRAC related activities.  
      The Fonds régionaux d’aide aux conseils, are managed regionally. They are 
responsible for the tasks delegated to the districts as an outcome of the eighties 
devolution strategy, which conveyed from Paris to the provinces political authority in a 
number of activities such as budgetary control, technological innovation, civic 
institutions and so on (Schmidt, 1991). The eighties delegation policy provided public 
administration with extra revenue by way of a contribution of levies and more subsidies 
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by means of a network of allowances. As a consequence, the economic power of regional 
councils has become more significant than in former years. Public administration 
spending increased from 300 FF mn in the eighties to 600 FF mn in the nineties. 
Subsequent to this devolution strategy, regional councils extensively utilized the 
assistance of professional advisers to elaborate on the modes of operation required to 
perform the duties and administer the funds they received from the government. 
      Whether or no the practice of consultation creates greater wealth as specialists 
maintain or results in chaos as opponents suggest is debatable. What this demonstrates, 
nevertheless, is that the practice of consultation is a greatly challenged area of expertise. 
We have to take into consideration some well known publications like the Witchdoctors, 
Con Tricks, or So-Called Experts to understand that professional advisers are not thought 
as worthy of belief. Even though there is a diversity of opinions about the practice of 
consultation, the government in France took a side in this controversy by adopting a 
course of action which associates specialists with the improvement of corporate 
governance as well as production systems. In this way, the French government had a part 
in what political science defines as social legitimation vis-à-vis professional advisers 
(Alvarez, 1996). It is significant to emphasize the legitimacy in the foundation of the 
practice of consultation since it is not officially acknowledged as an occupation. In 
contrast with other areas of expertise such as law and accountancy, the reputation or 
significance of specialists is not actually recognized by a body of people engaged in a 
profession that can authorize as proficient the ones with the appropriate skills. The 
prejudice against them is deep-rooted. Professional advisers are usually considered to be 
unreliable. The knowledge or expertise they assert is frequently questioned and this has a 
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great effect upon whether the customers can rely on them. On account of the 
unavailability of an occupational standing which can assist the practice of consultation to 
overcome this common difficulty, the government’s legitimating part is therefore 
imperative. With reference to specialists, this legitimating part involves two distinct 
methods, unreserved support in the field of production systems as I have already 
indicated, and utilization by the state of professional advisers to assist the transference of 
Total Quality Management to corporate governance. 
      After the delegation of tasks, regional councils progressively made use of the practice 
of consultation to realize the potential of the latest structure and to administrate the 
increased authority that originated from Paris. A few of the most significant professional 
advisers in public administration are companies such as Bossard, CEGOS, Ernst & 
Young and Price Waterhouse. CEGOS was the biggest consultation group in France until 
daughterly companies of parent corporations from the United States like Kearney and 
McKinsey were established in Paris between the mid sixties and the late sixties (Cailluet, 
2000). In agreement with the directors of the Price Waterhouse in Paris, an increasing 
number of large local authorities are employing auditing and consulting firms to advise 
them on specific areas of their own activity or the activities of their companies or other 
related bodies which they control (Paquier and Townhill, 1991). French firms such as 
Bossard and CEGOS launched in the eighties Local Collectivities Division to expand 
their network and those departments hire about 30 specialists each (Saint-Martin, 2001). 
The practice of consultation and its utilization by regional councils came to be so 
significant in the eighties that professional advisers started to arrange meetings every year 
entitled Collectivité locales, du bon usage des consultants, with the purpose of 
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exchanging ideas and emotions in regard to public administration (Chirot, 1993). 
Accordingly, during the eighties and the nineties, a variety of academic journals meant 
for public servants started to prepare and issue several essays on how to form close 
relationships with specialists.   
      In the early eighties, subsequent to a formal discussion in parliament, the Minister in 
charge of Administrative Reform pledged that his agents will promote Total Quality 
Management in the public sector (Chevallier, 1988). Later on, the Association française 
des cercles de qualité founded a Civil Service Group intended to research the diffusion of 
Total Quality Management from the private to the public sector. The conversion of those 
objectives into policies was made easier when, as a sequel to the victory of the 
conservative party of Jacques Chirac, the state authorized the practice of auditing and 
consultation in order to help the AFCERQ rebuild public administration. 
      With the aid of professional advisers the strategy adopted by the parliament was 
focused on the empowerment of local officials, the decentralization of managerial tasks, 
the cross-functional transmission of information as well as the modernization of civic 
institutions (Barouch and Chavas, 1993). The course of action was greatly affected by 
Total Quality Management. It was designed to assist, the practice of administrative 
statements which identify standard operating procedures, in every branch of public 
administration, the initiation of quality control to upgrade the provision of services, the 
instigation of voice mechanisms to make communication less difficult for all the 
specialized sections, and lastly, the intertwinement of personal achievement and bonus 
schemes by way of the institution of a programme that derives from performance 
contracts (Rouban, 1989). 
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      In this section I have attempted to display an interdisciplinary perspective which 
emphasizes the affiliation of production systems with corporate governance in the 
process of innovation in management. To comprehend the emergence of Total Quality 
Management in corporate governance, it is of special prominence to analyze the 
evolution taking place in the field of production systems. Researchers in one discipline 
usually try to explain mutations in a certain field of knowledge by enquiring into the 
resolutions reached after consideration in that same discipline. The research in public 
administration will enquire into the establishments that exert influence on decision-
making and investigate what policy-makers and bureaucrats in those organizations have 
done previously, whereas researchers will study how incremental adjustments in the non-
state controlled part of the economy are formulated by the preceding circumstances in the 
private sector (Goedegeburre, 1993). Business strategy is a procedure determined by 
path-dependency, but this can turn into path-departure when clear objectives are defined, 
and they are not part of the same field of knowledge, but of various disciplines. 
      Therefore, in an effort to reorganize the nationalized firms according to the principles 
of Total Quality Management, politicians did not only imitate the non-state controlled 
companies inasmuch as, with respect to Total Quality Management, the privatized firms 
were themselves, to a degree governed by the state. The rise of Total Quality 
Management is not simply an account of business related events. This is not just a 
narrative of the prosperous businessman who resorts to his ingenuity, talent and 
inspiration to add to the profitability of his enterprise. It is an account of events which 
includes statutory legislation and governmental mediation.                                                                                       
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Expansion of the Multinational Corporations 
 
      Internationalization signifies the loss of state authority. As maintained by scholars, it 
indicates the decline of the domestic government, an escape from the categories of the 
national state (Beck, 2000). They claim that although the domestic government was a 
pillar of strength for the home economy, the global economy formed as a result of 
internationalization has impaired the domestic government since a multiplicity of social 
circles, communication networks, market relations and lifestyles, none of them specific to 
any particular loyalty, now cut across the boundaries of the national state (Maclean et al. 
2001). The diminution of the domestic government, too unimportant for the difficult 
matters, though too important for the simple questions, in agreement with some 
commentators, can accelerate the formation of a complex system of global business and 
international agreements (Bell, 1987). 
Table 5: Mergers and Acquisitions, Total (1990-1998) 
 
Global ($ billion) Europe ($ billion) France (FF billion) 
M&A M&A M&A 
2400 325 837 
Increase Increase Increase 
+50% +49% +32% 
 
Source: L’Expansion, 1999. 
      Nevertheless, other scholars call into question this rationale, thinking of 
internationalization as an approach to flexibility (Hay et al. 1999). According to them, 
internationalization takes place in, through, and under the aegis of states, it is encoded by 
them and in important respects even authorized by them (Panitch, 1996). The 
globalization of France’s markets seems to have been directed by the French government. 
It increased rapidly as foreign goods and exported articles totaled between forty-three 
The Reform of Corporate Governance in France 43 
percent, and forty-five percent of GDP in the early nineties, and forty-seven percent, and 
fifty percent in the late nineties. Nonetheless, these numbers are still below its major 
European contenders, Britain and Germany, the difference in comparison with the United 
Kingdom has become larger (Milner, 2001). Something else that suggests increasing 
globalization, money invested from abroad, appears to be more favourable and is strongly 
associated with the reorganization of big companies. Between the eighties and the 
nineties, money invested from abroad increased to a large extent, and France was near the 
top, just below the United States of America, with regard to profits from buying and 
selling shares in multinational corporations (Houdebine and Topiol-Bensaid, 1997). 
Internationalization in this way thoroughly transformed the nature of France’s large 
enterprises, whose attachment to the government had started to become less tight since 
the eighties. 
Table 6: Mergers and Acquisitions, Cross-border (1990-2000) 
 
Global ($ billion) Europe ($ billion) France (FF billion) 
M&A M&A M&A 
 100 291 
Increase Increase Increase 
+69% +67% +85% 
 
Source: L’Expansion, 2001. 
      The French aristocracy is well known for its influence and self reliance, and for 
retaining its political or social authority in spite of adjustment like regulation or 
deregulation (Windolf, 1999). Strangely enough, denationalization supported the unity of 
the ruling class via the institution of noyaux durs, solid financiers well organized to 
reinforce corporate protection from speculators, especially from overseas, therefore 
consolidating the ownership and control of enterprises by an exclusive society, usually 
associated by means of fellowship to major politicians (Bauer, 1988). But more recently, 
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some of those noyaux durs have broken up, apparently not able to hold out against the 
forces of internationalization, drawing attention to the controversy on the stock exchange, 
the demand to trade shares of indigenous companies which are not highly competitive in 
money markets becomes stronger when chief executives are not only French but 
European and American (Maclean, 1997). What is more, the latest management efforts 
have focused on reducing to five the amount of directorates a single entrepreneur can take 
over, thus restraining the interlocking shareholdings and mutual relations which have 
always been the mainstay of the French model (Marini, 1996). How, in brief are the 
French aristocracy and companies dealing with the adaptation to a different, political, 
economic and social environment of globalization? 
      The discussions of the eighties as follows formed the public opinion of the nineties, 
internationalization and the regulations of the European Union were assumed to be true 
and valid. Nevertheless, this general agreement was not admitted as a basis for argument, 
and it was not founded on collective opinion, which became apparent in the general vote 
on the Maastricht Treaty. The early nineties campaign and Jack Chirac’s renunciation of 
la pensée unique, brought about a state of indecision between two alternatives, flexibility 
and protection, that defined French industrial relations in the late nineties and shaped 
Lionel Jospin’s policies which are comparable to Tony Blair’s Third Way. 
      Besides, ownership and the internationalization of corporations rise a number of 
questions for further research, for instance, have the enterprises established an accounts 
commission and works council, as proposed by the Viénot Report, or an appointments 
commission, which the document considered to be valuable but not indispensable? What 
is the structure of these commissions, and does this framework indicate a shift to more 
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flexibility, to embody less restrained non-members, or are these commissions comprised 
of executives, within the organization? Does the commission structure reinforce the 
maintenance of mutual relations within the company, similar to those that can be found 
between directors? There is evidence to support the multipositionality of the French 
ruling class, as defined by some commentators, in a wide range of fields. Furthermore, do 
French corporations have a dual system, typical of the German variant, or a uniform 
character, with a Président Directeur Générale, in whom the roles of chairperson and 
managing director are fused? The first attaches special prominence on responsibility and 
clarity, whereas the second endorses that strong leadership is more significant than 
quality control. 
      The process of selecting managers and learning skills is fulfilled by the grand corps, 
the peak of France’s corporate governance, succession to which is conditional on 
qualifications obtained at a top grande école. Scholars define the grand corps as 
placement bureaux, indicating that nobody was ever admitted in the Inspection des 
Finances to manage resources, or the Corps des Mines for a job in coalmining (Suleiman, 
1978). After about ten years of holding a post in government, usually in public 
administration, aristocrats are parachuted into the board of directors of a large firm, a 
procedure described as parachutage or pantouflage. The ones who descend from well 
known dynasties set their sights on gaining expertise to authorize their standing which 
serves as an explanation for the preservation of the aristocracy in France, and the current 
economic environment. 
      What is important about France’s economy is that the difference between the big 
companies, the Cotation assistée en continu 40, and the small and medium enterprises, 
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the Société des bourses français 125, is quite large and big network capitalism is 
persistent. The gap between France’s large firms and the small and medium enterprises is 
quite remarkable, with regard to the extent of globalization. As a matter of fact, those 
firms which are not among the first 100 usually have a less international capital structure, 
and they rely very much upon the home environment. This is significant, because apart 
from France’s 2000 large corporations in the stock market, France’s 2,000,000 small 
businesses are also of great effect. 
      It is not wise to proclaim the demise of the French model of business administration. 
A research in the late nineties by Korn Ferry International displayed that about sixty-six 
percent of the directors of CAC-40 firms, the best of the ruling class, had graduated from 
the grandes écoles, ENA and Polytechnique, in spite of the fact there is now an increasing 
amount of Présidents Directeurs Généraux, who graduated from universities like HEC or 
ESSEC, or colleges which offer courses in American corporate governance, like 
INSEAD, or the Harvard Business School (Basini, 1998). None the less, for the greater 
part, graduation from a grande école prior to participation in a grand corps is still the 
most usual way to the crowning point of French management. 
      The Arthuis Report demonstrates that, although early globalization policies assumed 
by French corporations aspired to economic expansion, French money invested abroad 
during the nineties was basically stimulated by the quest for low wages, in parts of 
Africa, in far-east Asia, and also in East Europe, putting at risk a number of occupations 
in a variety of industries at home. Nevertheless, a Senate announcement attempted to 
moderate the concerns for unemployment, paying attention to the advantages relating to a 
long period of time of financial development for those industries. Data from the nineties 
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indicates that the apprehension of money invested in low-cost regions was not justified, 
the developing nations amounted to just 1.5% of France’s money invested overseas in the 
mid-nineties. At the same time, France’s money invested domestically, raised 
employment by 15% in the mid-nineties, in agreement with the Délégation à 
l’aménagement du territoire et à l’action régionale (Oudin, 1998). 
      Outsourcing of manufacturing has not been as extensive in France as in other 
countries, due to the fact that its economy has been more regulated, though the control of 
business has changed, according to the publications of commentators (Maclean et al. 
2001). In the early nineties, the liquidity of French corporations was going down, but by 
the late nineties had increased (Milner, 2001; Schmidt, 2000). Forty-five percent of the 
liquid assets of French firms were owned by insurance agencies in the USA (Maclean et 
al. 2001; Strauss-Kahn, 1999). In the long run fluctuations like this could make the 
French economy susceptible to lower costs and consequently liable to shift employment 
to low-wage regions, but this is mostly counterbalanced by general and continued 
tendencies. In comparison with Britain and Germany, the general notion that money 
invested in vocational training is impaired by economic internationalization is not evident 
in French enterprises. For the most part, French subsidiaries of multinational corporations 
are defined by relatively high wages, and highly trained personnel (Milner, 2001). French 
capability of attracting international business as a result can be attributed to the existence 
of high technical expertise, which means that money invested in vocational training also 
makes provisions for the stability of productivity in France. 
      Accordingly, the transformation of production since the decade of the seventies must 
be thought as the renunciation of financial dirigisme by the French government, in an 
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effort to respond to increasing internationalization and other domestic needs and 
requirements. The welfare system was very important in assisting the demolition of 
financial dirigisme by alleviating the blow of unemployment and dissolution of the 
workforce, undermining the process of reorganization. This is endorsed by the 
augmentation of public expenditure from 24% of Gross Domestic Product in the eighties 
to 30% in the nineties, as France becomes the most charitable government, in short, de-
dirigisation and welfare state expansion were two sides of the same coin (Levy, 2000). 
Expressing the same thing differently, this change was both an outcome and a mechanism 
of financial adaptation. 
      France’s dynamic industrial programmes have often been inspired from the European 
Union principles and criteria. Accordingly, the Martin Aubry legislation in making 
provisions for those most insecure has been given the definition of Nouveau Départ, 
which attaches special prominence to European Union standards of younger employees 
finding a job within a semester, and older employees getting a job within a year. 
According to the Nouveau Départ, those less than twenty-five years old are provided with 
education, or public utility work, during the first year of signing up with the social 
security department. A relatively large number of youth join this program on a yearly 
basis, and about five hundred thousand are helped in finding a job within a semester. On 
the whole the state’s anti-exclusion policy, costs 50 FF bn in a couple of years, with 200 
FF mn contributed by the European Social Fund (Passeron, 2000). 
      The liberal doctrine founded upon the necessity to adjust to internationalization, has 
formed the strategies of the Left and Right and the course of action adopted by the 
government in the nineties. In the meanwhile, the two objectives of labour market 
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strategies, to moderate the impact of financial liberalization as well as to assist the 
reorganization of big companies, has put the state under pressure to drive towards 
opposite directions. France’s course of action proposed by the Left is similar to the third 
way adopted by some European nations, but persists as politically aligned to government 
interference in economic strategies, in spite of the restraints of the Maastricht Treaty and 
the financial affairs reform. The reorganization has made France’s revenue shortage go 
down from three percent of Gross Domestic Product in 1998 to less than three percent in 
1999, and one percent at the turn of the century. Regardless of this major improvement, 
France is often criticized in the European Union for its national expenditure and political 
intervention which depend strongly upon money granted by the state to large firms. In 
this way, the EMU becomes a platform for adaptation, and makes available the space 
needed for flexibility with regard to financial development. Occasionally this 
particularity sets France in opposition to its European partners, as commentators suggest, 
expansion of state intervention is not merely a social imperative, but a measure of 
France’s capacity to preserve its sovereignty and identity in an increasingly integrated, 
interdependent world (Levy, 2000). 
      The inherent characteristics which define corporate governance in France are strong 
and persistent, it would be misleading to underrate their prolonged effect. It is improbable 
that the French aristocracy will give up the structure of interlocking directorates, fuelled 
by the grandes écoles, and grands corps, that has been so successful in the years gone by. 
It can be argued that mutual relations are at present more essential than in the past, in 
order to counterbalance the impact of internationalization. The existent economic 
environment, what is more, is contingent on efficient organization, and another argument 
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is that the established organizational structure may as well favour the French ruling class 
in the emerging international order. What is more reasonably expected instead of the 
dismantlement of cross-shareholdings in France is the adjustment to global markets, 
supported by the private sector, of the domestic government, through management 
strategies such as an increase in research and development, product variety, sub-
contracting and specialization. 
 
The Architecture of Portfolio Management 
 
      In reality, although the academic literature expresses unreservedly the powerful 
character of business administration networks, it identifies a French model in transition, 
those narratives are purely historical, without providing a theoretic interpretation 
(Berglof, 1997). For the most part, what is suggested, is a sequence of events, with regard 
to the varieties of business management. An approach like this is followed by scholars 
who research the qualities of the Japanese and the Western structures (Aoki, 1994). They 
display separate courses of action which can be thought ex ante. These propositions vary 
between a convergence of financial attributes, potentially destabilizing effects on 
opposite and long lasting networks by the intermediation of specific qualities, and the 
supremacy of the properties of a particular structure, to the evolvement to a hybrid form 
of higher order. It must be stated, however, that in later years some advance has been 
made towards improvement of our comprehension of the determining factors of 
organizational transformation (Dore et al. 1999; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 1997). 
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      It is significant to stress at this point that the dynamics of distinct business 
administration networks are compatible with a pluralistic concept with multiple 
stakeholders. In that case, why does the French model attach special prominence to the 
State, despite of facilitating the procedure of bargaining between institutional investors 
and other interest groups? One reason which can provide for an explanation is the 
presence of several economic and social actors in France. In addition, French labour 
institutions are historically defined by a class-fight ideology (Albert, 1991). 
Consequently, there is an inclination towards embracing exceptionally diverse opinions. 
This can also account for the large number of economic and social partners. In agreement 
with some commentators, a no consensus cooperation has contradictory implications 
(Peyrelevade, 1998; Wirtz 2004). As a result, it becomes evident, why the State has the 
part of an arbitrator. In reality, because general agreement between organizational 
entrepreneurs is difficult, the formation of mutually reinforcing relationships entails the 
constitution of a superior organization. This place has to be taken up by the State. 
Differently from what happens in other nations, the French State is not a simple 
instrument of social administration at the disposal of the citizens. It transcends the 
individuals and receives of the latter a sort of divine blessing, comparable to the one the 
monarchs received in the past (Lesourne, 1998). 
      In accordance with the ideology described in the preceding paragraph, the business 
management structure which exemplifies the discretionary policy of a wide range of the 
most prominent French enterprises was determined by the State’s administrative authority 
for a large number of years. In times gone by, this political authority was exerted, through 
a distinct course of action. Workplace relations every now and then prompted the State to 
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intervene in business decision making. Its interference with money management was an 
important instrument of exercising power. The business administration network of the 
most significant enterprises, that incorporated the champions of the home economy, was 
closely related to the parliament. And, lastly, quite a few members of the entrepreneurial 
aristocracy still owe their training and expertise to the civil service. 
      To this point, we have basically portrayed the inherent characteristics of the French 
structure of business administration, which had a great impact on its profile in the past. 
More recently, the network has, nevertheless, experienced a transfiguration, as is 
confirmed by the BNP-Société Générale-Paribas takeover battle. In addition, subsequent 
to the decentralization that took place in the eighties, the evolvement of French business 
management has been defined by the decreased importance of the State. In these 
circumstances, the developments of the eighties triggered a vast transformation of the 
business administration. It may have come as a surprise that this initiative was taken by a 
left-wing government. We will discuss the significance of this comment later on, going 
back to the case of France after the demonstration of our theoretical proposition. French 
devolution entailed as a result that some enterprises had to resort to the stock exchange to 
secure the money resources they required. Therefore the State’s intervention in money 
management was further diminished. Initially, a significant part of the large businesses 
continued to be, nevertheless, in the jurisdiction of the civil service. The shift in politics 
during the eighties, led to a number of denationalizations. This made the State’s 
retirement from business management more evident. The effect of a wave of 
denationalizations on the business system in France was quite remarkable. Besides, some 
scholars who studied the current and recent publications on denationalizations with 
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reference to the total amount of privatized enterprises, gave an account of the French 
programme as one of the world’s most ambitious privatization programmes (Alexandre 
and Charreaux, 2004). The transfer of control and ownership was briefly suspended in the 
late eighties because of one more shift in politics, to be resumed in another surge of 
denationalizations which started in the early nineties. It must be said, nevertheless, that 
the State’s withdrawal was not entire. In reality, by establishing the noyaux durs, the civil 
service retained its ability of affecting to some extent the reformation of the business 
management of most of the recently denationalized firms. Noyaux dur, or hard core, is 
the technical name which defines the coalition of principal stockholders who are 
appointed to membership by invitation. As a consequence, at the beginning, intervention 
by the State was substituted with interference by other enterprises through coalitions of 
major shareholders. The parliament in this way exercised administrative authority by 
taking part in those principal stockholder coalitions. It is worth mentioning that the group 
of firms invited to make up the noyaux durs in the circumstances relevant to the wave of 
denationalizations was somewhat restricted. As a result of this, the business 
administration structure with regard to the large French enterprises, previously bound by 
the State’s political authority, was defined by a comprehensive system of crossed 
holdings for a long time. These crossed holdings were also in close association with 
personal relationships and resulted in the composition of several interlocking directorates. 
In the nineties, this structure started to disintegrate, gradually substituting the old model 
of business management with financial market oriented instruments (Wirtz, 2000). As a 
consequence of this, most of the large firms have, right now, a permanent long-term 
financing which makes them prone to a leveraged buyout. 
The Reform of Corporate Governance in France 54 
      The principal agency theory and the connection of the actor with his organizational 
quarters are well known, so how can a transformation in the official or unofficial 
restrictions be interpreted? To be sure, to make this interpretation possible, a practical 
model of human reasoning is required. Some commentators have provided with 
theoretical explanations about the path dependent nature of human rationality (North, 
1990). This indicates that repeated, varied and unsystematic attempts or experiments are 
continued until successful (Simon, 1983; Wirtz, 2000). This attitude can be justified on 
the grounds that an economic actor or social partner neither has total awareness of all 
qualities defining the conditions or circumstances, nor does he entirely comprehend all 
determinants that influence the result of his performance. The economic actor or social 
partner comes to a conclusion or resolution as to future action through a supposition or 
system of ideas explaining the environment in which he acts. In the field of historical 
institutionalism, such concepts are better known as mental patterns or mental models. In 
fact, this is the point from which the economic theory of the process of organizational 
reform begins. Some scholars have described this as follows. The key to the choices that 
individuals make is their perceptions, which are a function of the way the mind interprets 
the information it receives (North, 1993). The intellectual domain forms the explanations 
and thus affects someone’s intuitive recognition of the possibilities implicated by the 
organizational environment. This is the incarnation of the supreme philosophy, in other 
words an intellectual background which is used jointly with other important persons. 
Therefore, a certain organizational structure can also be thought as the conversion of a 
collective intellectual domain into effective organizations. This is compatible with some 
commentators’ perception of organizations as a self-sustaining system of shared beliefs 
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(Aoki, 2001). So as to comprehend how organizations change over the years, it is of 
special importance to draw attention to the influence of a shared ideology. As some 
scholars have expressed it, institutions clearly are a reflection of the evolving mental 
models (Denzau and North, 1994). 
      This analysis brings into prominence the businessman as the motive power of 
organizational transformation. The average executive may be described by some distinct 
characteristics. One of them has been displayed, specifically the existence of an 
intellectual background having the ability for challenging the prevalent philosophy. 
However, a novel idea about organizational change is not enough to convert someone’s 
ideology into moral power. That is likely to happen, only if the businessman is prepared 
to devote his energies to this. It becomes clear why, in principle, it is not the executive 
who acts reciprocally with the organizational environment. What drives the process of 
reformation is, generally, accepted as being the continuous interaction between 
institutions and organizations (North, 1993). Therefore, the institution can be thought as a 
facilitating mechanism to achieve moral influence. It must be said, nevertheless, that the 
establishments which possibly help businessmen in their attempt to affect the 
environment of administrative management are not confined to the financial industry. 
The chiefs of various groups like the public administration, labour institutions, works 
councils and private enterprises can often have recourse to their own assets as a means of 
bringing innovation. 
      By restraining the interaction between the economic actors, the business 
administration network brings into line the chief executive’s objectives with those of the 
social partners (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This is significant in our effort to analyze the 
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general notion of the intellectual domain for the interpretation of the determining factors 
of the business management structure. Without doubt, as the process of forming the rules 
of the game, the existent business administration network may be defined as being the 
organizational incarnation of the collective intellectual domain in a certain period. We are 
indebted to scientific study in the field of investment management as well as the principal 
agent approach for our comprehension of the dynamics of business administration (Daily 
et al. 2003). In accordance, the notion of appreciation is of special prominence in our 
attempt to understand the effect of the disagreement about profits between organizational 
entrepreneurs on the selection of business management networks (Jensen, 2001). 
Although in some of these structures appreciation is confused with shareholder value, this 
is not always the case (Castanias and Helfat, 1992; Garvey and Swan, 1994). What is 
more, to confuse appreciation with shareholding interests is founded on the wrong 
presumption that the stockholders are the exclusive owners of the enterprise. However, 
such a preconception is also liable to be affected by a certain ideology, specifically the 
one which some commentators define as the monistic concept of the firm (Yoshimori, 
1995). Because this philosophy does not relate to all cases, an interpretation of business 
administration built entirely upon such an idea, does not make clear, what are the motive 
forces affecting change. Therefore, it is more suitable to describe appreciation as an 
increase in total assets (Charreaux and Desbriéres, 2001). The controversy on profits 
between institutional investors can be identified in a broader sense as a contest for the 
formation of capital and its distribution. In this context, the well known theory of value 
has a great effect on the usual practices which are relevant to the generation and 
allocation of resources in a particular organization. This is in agreement with some 
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scholars’ suggestion that the innate qualities of disagreement are contingent on the 
organizational environment (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). The subsequent statement 
about the supreme philosophy which shapes the determinants of business management 
can be made, a shared ideology is a representation of the role of different stakeholders in 
the value creation process as well as of the appropriate remuneration of their services 
(Wirtz, 2000). This is, by all means, a standard description of the prevalent philosophy, 
and it is quite possible that an attempt to define a real ideology would result in more 
complicated explanations. Consequently, our method is a parsimonious model in 
clarifying the development of business administration structures. It is not actually 
designed to provide a complete list of theoretical views. 
      We have pointed out that the established French business management network was 
not receptive to financial strategies which increase shareholder value that can readily be 
distributed to stockholders. In accordance with this mental pattern, the diverse sectors of 
organizational entrepreneurs were considered to be a trademark of the State’s dominant 
part in business administration. More than that, this organizational structure was 
accompanied by a predisposition to mutually reinforcing relationships as well as an 
inclination to the policy of cross-shareholdings and interlocking directorates. A supreme 
philosophy like this was not essentially embraced by everybody, nevertheless, which 
entails that entrepreneurialism could not be removed from consideration. This judgment 
is endorsed by the circumstances related to the first significant hostile takeover battle in 
the French business system in a long period of time. 
      This assessment is not contradictory with our theoretical proposal. In agreement with 
this, the prevalent ideology plays an important role in resisting disruptive organizational 
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change in national business management structures and their inherent characteristics. For 
example, B.S.N.’s takeover bid was rejected, by reason of opposition which to a great 
extent was due to the supreme philosophy. This played a significant part in resisting 
radical institutional change in the French business administration network.  As a result, 
shareholder activism was virtually unknown in the business management structure of 
France before the nineties. The late takeover attempt involving large financial 
establishments demonstrates the progress French corporate governance has made since 
then. The next paragraph examines in detail the facts which later on transformed the 
character of French business administration. 
      It is of special importance to consider that this prominent organizational change was 
initiated by the State. The institutional investors, who set in motion the procedure of 
reformation, have to be identified at the level of the civil service. With regard to this 
topic, it is significant to recollect the proposition that a businessman will have to take 
some initiative. Primarily, he must be able to perceive of alternatives which can challenge 
the prevalent philosophy. Subsequently, he will have to find a way to fulfill his large 
scale plan. In these circumstances, it is possible that the liberal transformation was 
successful on the grounds that the delegates of the State, main advocate of the supreme 
ideology were the pioneers. This makes clear why, in this instance, and in contrast with 
other individual initiatives taken before, the prevalent philosophy was not a stumbling 
block for organizational reform. Indeed, our theoretical proposal clarifies the difference 
between the supreme ideology and the collective intellectual domain of the institutional 
investors. In the French example, it is reasonable to suggest that the dissatisfaction in the 
public opinion was not significant this time, inasmuch as it was the State in control of the 
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institutional transformation. This is in accordance with a point of view made by 
commentators with reference to the State’s function, a colbertistic State which has not 
ceased to dominate the economy, protectionistic and dirigistic on the one hand, but 
investor, creator, on the other (Albert, 1991). For the reason that it was originating from 
the driving force of the prevalent philosophy, the effort was accompanied with 
legitimacy. At this stage, we must note as well that the noyaux durs, which were to some 
extent comprised of enterprises from the public sector, strongly supported a French 
resolution. In this manner, the State expressed its will to reform the network, without 
encouraging the abrupt disengagement from the old structure. 
      North American organizational entrepreneurs did not like at all the non-transparent 
structure of crossed holdings that was widespread in French corporate governance until as 
recently as the nineties. As a consequence, the increasing influence of organizational 
entrepreneurs from abroad on large French firms was in agreement with the disintegration 
of interlocking directorates set up between the late eighties and the early nineties. 
Scholars, who recorded the figures of the nineties, noted a historical decline of cross 
shareholdings (Wirtz, 2004). This trend seems to have been escalated more recently. As a 
result, the biggest French companies have a more dispersed portfolio than in years gone 
by, making them susceptible to arrangements virtually unknown in French business 
management such as takeover bids. The data released in the press with regard to French 
enterprises indicates that some of the companies listed on the CAC 40 have arrived at a 
ratio of less than 15% with reference to large stockholders (ibid. 2004). Having said that, 
in comparison with Anglo-Saxon shareholding trends, the control of the largest French 
firms persists as fairly consolidated (La Porta et al. 1999). Nevertheless, this part draws 
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attention to the gradual progress of a certain business administration network, and France 
has gone through a major reformation in respect of the decline in the number of crossed 
holdings, despite the discrepancies with other nations (ibid. 1999). Then, what the 
persistent consolidation of stockholding displays in relation to current trends of business 
management in France is not that they were inert, but that their development was path 
dependent. In some occasions, the pressure exercised by foreign shareholders on the 
business administration structure of family controlled enterprises was very powerful. This 
is illustrated by a review of the takeover attempt of Group André, instigated at the turn of 
the century by the French businessman Guy Wyser-Pratte and underpinned by a US trust 
company, NR Atticus (Albouy and Schatt, 2004). Once they obtained a sizable 
proportion through the Stock Exchange in Group André’s shareholding portfolio, twenty-
five percent for a start, the American entrepreneurs overpowered the owners and enforced 
critical modifications in the organization of the executive committee. This case may well 
be taken as a guide for subsequent cases, with regard to the relevancy of French corporate 
governance, as being effectively protected from the pursuit of stockholder value in the 
financial markets. The fact that the Group André takeover bid was unprecedented in the 
French context when it happened makes it an organizational change of special 
prominence. It is interesting, that the main advocate of this course of action, Guy Wyser-
Pratte, expressed unreservedly his view to drive the French mode of capitalism towards 
American principles (ibid. 2004). 
      Our investigation makes evident that the State was, for quite a while, the starting 
point for entrepreneurial initiative in France. The privatized firms had a less significant 
part. For example, an organizational change was undertaken by the chief executive of 
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B.S.N., in the past, but it was resisted and subsequently renounced. It is of special 
importance that in the reform of French corporate governance the State was at the centre 
of its own partial withdrawal. Therefore, the usually powerful organizational effect for 
the financial affairs by officials of the State having subsided, a chance was offered by 
circumstances for businessmen of the private sector. Lately, organizational entrepreneurs 
have emerged as very influential, in supporting a philosophy of business management 
that encourages the creation of stockholder value. 
 
Bringing Innovation to the Privatized Firms 
 
      The French wave of denationalizations, which started in the eighties, represents one 
of the most important plans at international level, both in respect of the volume and of the 
significance of the buy outs, and with regard to the amount of the privatized firms 
(Bortolotti et al. 1998; Jones et al. 1999; Megginson, 2000). In agreement with some 
scholars with reference to buy outs during the seventies, the French plan was in terms of 
importance just below Britain and Japan, and with regard to volume, it constitutes, in the 
eighties, about twelve per cent and, during the nineties, around eight per cent of 
denationalizations and approximately eleven per cent of those of the OECD nations 
(Huang and Levich, 1998). Even though the cause and effect of French denationalizations 
are, to a considerable degree, explicit, they are also part of a global trend, which is more 
than usual in the highly industrialized nations. As other commentators indicate, the 
contribution of the State Owned Enterprises in the Gross National Product of these 
economies decreased, in slightly over a decade, from about nine percent to around five 
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per cent, this diminution of the part of the State seems to be more significant in less 
industrialized nations (Megginson and Netter, 2001). 
      Most of the research is founded on the ratios utilized to assess the efficiency of the 
privatized firms, and therefore is focused on the creation of shareholding interests. The 
implication is that the neo-liberal doctrine, the basis of shareholder value, is appropriate. 
The presence of the external economic environment raises doubts about this theory. An 
approach of avoiding this controversy is to assume, in accordance with the new trend in 
new institutional economics, that the acceptance of the policy of creation of shareholding 
interests contributes in fine to the highest possible decrease of inefficiency and, finally, to 
enhance to the utmost the well being of the different groups of interests. 
      In the literature about the influence of the restraining mechanisms on the efficiency, 
in agreement with some scholars, two determining factors are compared (Alexandre and 
Charreaux, 2004). They are both of a cross-functional dimension, one contrasts the 
effectiveness of the denationalized corporations with that of a set of state owned 
enterprises and the other with the potential efficiency if they had stayed in the pubic 
sector. In conformity with the findings of most of this research, effectiveness 
significantly improves with privatizations. The research associates with a small amount 
of sectors, subject to regulation. This special form of procedure has disadvantages. The 
analysis which depends on the possible efficiency is based on controversial presumptions. 
As for the method, which compares the denationalized corporations with the state owned 
enterprises, it has to deal with the problem of setting benchmarks. 
      An alternative approach of contrasting the effectiveness, prior and subsequent to 
privatizations, assumes that the impact of denationalizations appears immediately, that 
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there is a break, or a disengagement, which implicates the improvement of the efficiency. 
In reality, from one point of view, in some corporations, there is a reorganization before 
the denationalizations, from another point of view the influence of privatizations may 
become manifest later on. The enhancement of the effectiveness arises as the actual 
consequence of the evolvement of business administration networks, the reform of 
institutional structures and the adoption of a different policy which can be time-
consuming, due to the rigidity of state owned enterprises. The procedure followed by 
some experts, which is composed of examining if there is a large difference in the 
efficiency between the years before the privatizations and the years after the 
denationalizations, may help us to understand the impact of privatizations, in other words 
the improvement of the effectiveness (Megginson et al. 1994). 
      The macroeconomic environment is in a greater or less degree, advantageous at the 
time of denationalizations. The added versatility provided by privatizations is contingent 
on the economic external conditions, therefore, a company rarely issues shares in a 
market with falling prices and French denationalizations were briefly postponed after a 
failure of the stock exchange. Expressing the same thing differently, from a business 
management perspective, the strictness of the regulation prescribed by the financial 
markets is considered as an effect of the macroeconomic environment, and it is 
strengthened in times of recessions. Moreover, the reorganization of institutions is less 
difficult when political external conditions are advantageous, the influence of 
privatizations is greater in these circumstances. 
      The strictness of the regulation associated with the financial markets is determined by 
the incorporation of the firm in the French Cotation assistée continu 40. This registration 
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entails the increased participation of the organizational entrepreneurs and large scale 
financiers and the bulk of proceedings are more important for the equity of these 
corporations. The strictness of the restraints is thought as advantageous for the 
performance. The reorganization that takes place in a period of denationalizations 
culminates in a diversified stockholding portfolio. The State retains to some extent part of 
ownership and control. When privatizations improve the effectiveness, the larger the part 
of ownership and control the smaller the impact of denationalizations. The prescribed 
regulation is conditional, in any case, on the origin of the organizational entrepreneurs 
and large scale financiers, as well as the net value of the enterprise. Different indicators 
can measure the stocks in the portfolio individually possessed by the State, the 
organizational entrepreneurs, and the workers, in a period of denationalizations. In 
addition, the potential for a good result in privatizations, is more likely when there is a 
predominant stockholder, a ratio that accounts for the equity possessed by a leading 
investor after denationalizations was established. Buyouts were linked, for the most part, 
with a new management. Due to the nature of administration in the plan of French 
denationalizations, only a small portion of directors remained as a result. In a similar 
fashion, the committees of executives were completely restructured. Some scholars have 
used other indicators to display the important alterations in the commissions of 
executives (D’Souza et al. 2000). In many cases, owing to the fact that the changes in 
respect of the participation of the State and the workers, in the committees of executives 
of the large French corporations were more than 50%, in reality, a ratio calculating the 
reorganization would have been more appropriate. Regardless of the problems in the 
evaluation of the restraints imposed by the commissions of executives with the only 
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available data, for instance, the number of managers or the percentage of works 
councillors, with the intention to contrast our findings with those of the analysts, we can 
nevertheless experiment with other determining factors. After privatizations, we observe 
a rise in the money paid by a company to stockholders, usually perceived as a 
strengthening of regulation prescribed by the investors. Even though the hypothesis 
which supports this strategy as a restraining mode is not based on data, the connection 
between the performance of denationalizations and the restructuring of enterprises is 
measured by the correlation Dividend / Net Income in absolute variation. 
Table 7: List of Privatized Companies Included in the Sample and of their Principal Characteristics 
 
 Privatization Date Issue Size State Holdings 
Before (%) 
State Holdings 
After (%) 
AGF 
 
1996 10,000 100 0 
Banque Nationale 
de Paris 
1993 4,920 100 40 
Compagnie 
Générale 
1987 11,560 100 0 
Crédit Commercial 
De France 
1987 4,400 100 0 
Crédit Local de 
France 
1993 2,040 51 20 
Elf 
 
1994 40,500 51 13 
Havas 
 
1987 2,410 100 0 
Paribas 
 
1987 17,500 100 0 
Pechiney 
 
1995 8,000 100 44 
Renault 
 
1994 14,000 80 50 
Rhône-Poulenc 
 
1993 564 43 0 
Seita 
 
1995 6,500 100 13 
Société Générale 
 
1987 21,500 100 0 
Sogenal 
 
1987 1,500 100 0 
Suez 
 
1987 15,641 100 0 
TF1 
 
1987 1,240 100 0 
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Total Sa 
 
1992 5,400 34 15 
 
Usinor 
1995 23,500 100 8 
 
Source: Company annual reports and company websites, various years. 
      A review of the literature, in order to establish the fact that privatizations enhance 
productivity makes clear that denationalizations improve the effectiveness by providing 
for additional versatility (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001). This improvement of 
adjustability may be better understood if we examine the subsequent levers, the prospect 
of diversifying the range of investments, that to increase the value of the shares issued 
and that of the process of growing. These indicators will be calculated by the 
corresponding ratios, the internationalization of the turnover after privatizations as a 
percentage, comparing the amount of stockholders to the investment, and Financial Fixed 
Assets / Total Fixed Assets. 
      Another method that makes it plausible to measure the effectiveness is by examining 
the influence of denationalizations through the indicators of productivity assessed 
company by company and, as an estimate, in three years intervals, prior and subsequent 
to privatizations. The test of Wilcoxon carried out on the ratios estimated before as well 
as after denationalizations, provides for the assessment of this dynamic effect. Even 
though it is variables like the Return on Equity which assess the productivity, with the 
purpose of contrasting our findings with those of empirical research, other ratios will also 
be estimated, with the intention to provide a comprehensive analysis. Nevertheless, the 
other indicators are taken into account only as a supplement or as component parts that 
make it plausible to fully apprehend the enhancement of productivity, for instance, 
margin and profitability and corporate governance. 
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      When we take into consideration this data, buyouts appear to have a great effect on 
the productivity and the efficiency of the corporations. The indicators of sales as well as 
the levers of equity increase either for the mean or for the median. This improvement has 
to do with the diversification of portfolio, nevertheless, the money invested in extrinsic 
development does not seem to be substantial as the variable Financial Fixed Assets / 
Total Fixed Assets goes down, which means, either that denationalizations are not 
supplemented with a major advancement of this kind, or more likely, that the 
reorganization of the enterprises includes more dispossessions than purchases. The 
amount of foreign direct investment is on the increase. With reference to the number of 
employees, when the median drops by 10% the mean does not change, this result is 
therefore obscure. The adaptations have an impact on funding. The part of capitalization 
goes up and the part of indebtedness goes down in the composition of the portfolio. The 
Dividend / Net Income is on the increase. All the privatizations analyzed, as indicated 
above, took place between 1986/1987 and 1996/97.  
Table 8: Test of the Effect of Privatization on the Various Indicators 
 
Indicators 
 
Median Before 
-3 Years 
Mean Before 
+3 Years 
Median After 
-3 Years 
Mean After 
+3 Years 
Net Income / Sales 
 
1.4% 1.3% 3.1% 3.4% 
Equity + Financial 
Debts 
7.6% 8.6% 8.5% 11.3% 
Net Income / 
Equity 
13.7% 13% 15.3% 17.4% 
Return on Equity 
 
6.8% 5.4% 9.1% 10.9% 
Sales / Employees 
 
1.6 3.7 1.8 3.0 
Net Income / 
Employees 
20.9 99.7 62.3 162.5 
Total Assets / 
Employees 
1.6 31.2 2.8 43.0 
Investment / Total 
Assets 
3.6% 4.8% 4.8% 5.1% 
Investment / Sales 
 
4.8% 8.0% 7.7% 9.6% 
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Financial Assets / 
Total Assets 
23% 36.9% 18.6% 37.1% 
Financial Debts / 
Equity 
1.7 15.4 1.2 9.9 
Financial Debts / 
Total Assets 
36.9% 48.0% 31.7% 46.1% 
Cash Flow / 
Investment 
91.4% 324.3% 109.2% 164.4% 
Dividends / Sales 
 
0.3% 0.5% 0.9% 1.2% 
Dividends / Net 
Income 
20.5% 31.7% 34.8% 44.3% 
Number of 
Directors 
18 17 15 15 
Percentage of 
Outside Directors 
60.0% 59.5% 71.0% 68.1% 
Percentage of 
Sales Abroad 
38.0% 40.6% 52.0% 44.9% 
 
Source: Company annual reports and websites, various years. 
      While all the levers of margin and profitability produce comparable results, it must be 
stated that the variable which develops more after privatizations, does not change when 
we calculate the mean or the median, that is the Return on Sales. Denationalizations 
almost certainly resulted in the reorganization of the range of investments held by a 
company, which caused a marginal development. This progress is not evident 
nevertheless in productivity indicators, at least in the chosen period, which shows that the 
acceleration in profits was associated with virtually the same losses, because of over-
investment as part of the financing policy, at least as the increase of the Investment / 
Sales variable confirms. The chosen period is most likely too brief so that the 
improvement of effectiveness, traditionally linked with privatizations, can come into 
being as a process. This explanation is possible bearing in mind the findings of scholars, 
on the authority of which the dynamic efficiency of corporations becomes manifest, to a 
considerable extent, a few years after denationalizations (Alexandre and Charreaux, 
2004; Villalonga, 2000). As a consequence, this outcome, although it calls into question 
the theories of most of the academic literature on the subject of privatizations, is quite 
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possible. In agreement with the literature of organizational behaviour, the big enterprises 
are to some degree inflexible institutions, resistant to change, it is time-consuming for 
innovative policies to be implemented, the evolution of the business administration 
network is path-dependent, and the influence of denationalizations appears later. 
      The acceleration in profits, after privatizations, is conditional to a considerable extent 
on the value of shares apportioned to a predominant stockholder and leading investors 
from abroad. If, in keeping with the general principles of business management, these 
conclusions are ordinary, because they are a priori founded on the beneficial effect of the 
restraints associated with a consolidated stockholding or investors from overseas, the fact 
that the predominant stockholder is usually the State, what gives support to the findings 
of experts, in line with which this pressure culminates in a substantial improvement in 
effectiveness after denationalizations, denies the wrong presumption of the usually 
detrimental impact of the State as an entrepreneur on the efficiency (Ehrlich et al. 1994; 
Verbrugge et al. 1999). Leveraged buyouts which go together with a gradual detachment 
of the State will have a good chance of recuperation. The advantageous circumstances 
affiliated with investors from overseas are probably due to the regulation of business 
administration relevant to globalization. 
      Taking into account the recent events, can we argue that privatizations contributed to 
the enhancement of the effectiveness of the French corporations? To start with, a detailed 
inspection of the variables, like the mean and the median, displays significant 
developments. The denationalized enterprises, for the most part, increased their revenue, 
as well as their Return on Sales. Besides, there was an improvement in the monetary 
support of a company and better money management with a decrease of high 
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indebtedness. If the quantity of labour is considered to be fixed, the part of global 
operations was on the increase. Finally, the sum of dividends paid to stockholders was 
greater. A more careful analysis of these findings indicates, nevertheless, that most of 
those advances are not significant especially in respect of cost effectiveness and in 
addition, some of these developments took place prior to denationalizations. 
 
The Way Forward to Shareholder Value 
         
      In France the last twenty years have been a period of corporate finance growth in 
response to European Union directives, the privatization of public services, the rise of 
retirement accounts, and life insurance. The causes for these economic developments 
have been greater internationalization, and economic liberalization, and the effects are the 
growing number of stockholders and the diffusion of new products such as the Plan 
Epargne Populaire. In the mid-eighties the shareholders in France were only seven per 
cent in comparison with about seventeen per cent at the turn of the century, and new 
products and services such as life insurance, have increased, during the last twenty years 
or so, from only thirty per cent to about forty-seven per cent (Arrondel and Masson, 
2002; Dumontier et al. 2001).   
      Another important development is the decline of cross-shareholdings, for the most 
part hard cores formed by coalitions of stockholders, in general amounted to no more 
than twenty percent of the equity of the firms in the late nineties, in comparison with the 
usual rate which was about thirty percent in the early nineties (Les Echos, 12/10/98). To 
this amount, we can put together the stocks held by workers, around three percent, which 
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comprises of money saved in a fund whose administration is in reality affected to a large 
extent by the executives. When we join this rate as a supplement, the ownership of 
companies incorporated in the crossed holdings network amounts to no more than 
twenty-three percent of stocks. Furthermore, this amount goes down as one moves away 
from the nucleus of the group of shareholdings constituted by the major French firms. For 
instance, the coalition of shareholders in Elf supplies a smaller proportion of 
approximately seventeen percent and in Alcatel the coalition of stockholders amounts to 
an average of no more than roughly fifteen percent. On the whole, this style of ownership 
is somewhat less concentrated because of the increasing significance of organizational 
entrepreneurs from abroad in most large businesses. 
Chart 1: Foreign Shareholdings in French Companies within the Cross-Shareholding System (%) 
 
 
   
Source: LEREPS, 2000. 
      It is important to stress at this point that to comprehend the far reaching consequences 
of this shift, it becomes imperative to assess the relation between two different types of 
financial administration. Unit trusts were originally founded in the United States and 
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subsequently in other countries subject to a procedure of direct management where the 
savings are invested on a Defined Benefit principle. In the old style of British mutual 
funds, for instance, traditionally put together by big companies, regular payments are 
warranted by the company, and are proportional to earnings. Welfare schemes are 
subsidized by manager and worker donations into the reserve with the management 
making provisions for top ups depending on the surplus of the excess value over the face 
value. This naturally culminates in careful money control of a manager’s stock on the 
basis of introducing a spread of investment over several enterprises or products in a 
manner that reduces the risk of loss. Moreover, contributors request companies to abide 
by the rules of business management on the principle that negligence of duties may 
conclude in the cancellation of the investment. This particular type of financial 
administration nevertheless activates fairly large reserves and materializes in France by 
means of unit trusts such as Calpers which has substantial controlling interests in most of 
the CAC 40 firms. Inspired by economic liberalization in the United States, new players, 
the third-party account managers, have taken a leading part since the late eighties, and in 
a clearly noticeable manner since the early nineties. These investors and entrepreneurs 
are in charge of mutual funds on a Defined Contribution principle. The savings are 
invested promptly by the new partners who come into the possession of the exact amount 
and no less than they have deposited into the reserve. The exceptionally dynamic contest 
among institutional investors as well as organizational entrepreneurs becomes evident in 
the quest for dividend yields as the handling of these money resources is much more 
forceful and concentrates on stockholding interests. This organic transition and the way 
the defined contribution schemes decentralize corporate governance account for the 
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change in business strategy. It makes companies, like Fidelity or Templeton, to set 
objectives which emphasize the pursuit of profits. Taking into consideration the nature of 
their own active policies, it is necessary that the firms in which they are engaged 
maximize shareholder value. 
Chart 2: Shareholding by Foreign Mutual Funds in French Firms, Percentage of Capital Held 
 
 
 
Source: LEREPS, 2000. 
      In spite of discrepancies and irregularities in business strategy, organizational 
entrepreneurs have common objectives which have a specific outcome and that is to 
enhance shareholder value which is possibly conveyed to the stockholders. The share 
price achieved by the company, is of special prominence, and must be maximized to 
serve the interests of stockowners who are thought to be the ones who matter the most. It 
was in these circumstances that the concept of abiding by the regulations of corporate 
governance surfaced as a prerequisite, initially in the United States in the early nineties, 
and later on in Great Britain. 
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      The chief executives recognize that it is not very easy to find out what determines the 
portfolio manager’s criteria. Without doubt, there are, regional and sectoral standards. 
Therefore, in the Morgan Stanley Index, France attains a five or six percent stake of the 
allotment of international capital. The establishment of the Euro may cause this network 
to disintegrate. As a consequence there may be an improvement on the contest between 
companies to benefit from transactions (Morin, 1996). Apart from this, it is not as easy 
for the board of directors to comprehend the principles or standards that portfolio 
management is determined by. The subsequent general notions are frequently mentioned. 
The transparency of a resolution reached and of the settlement procedure, the quest for 
hidden value, and trust in the governance, which is considered as a question of reputation. 
      The chief executives always seek to draw investment from the international financial 
markets. But, it is imperative that, once they are present, large shareholders should not 
depart from a company after a short while. Though it is not easy to determine a period of 
time, it does nevertheless appear that, in many occasions, and for the most part unit trusts 
keep possession of their equity in French companies for three or four years. It may be for 
a shorter time, for example one and a half years is quoted for Fidelity, or for a prolonged 
term as when five years is mentioned. This style of financing is neither long-termism nor 
short-termism. 
      As a result, some managers speak of shared pedagogy. French firms are now 
becoming familiar with knowledgeable, experienced and well skilled financial 
administrators. But in the opinion of these economic actors, a firm has a good reputation 
if its executives are capable of saying yes and no, for instance, they should be able to 
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draw distinctions between moderate claims which sustain the long term ownership equity 
and requests that culminate in the elimination of the short term funding (Morin, 1998). 
      The bottom line is the capacity to clarify company policy. Organizational 
entrepreneurs persist on transparency, just one centralized business, for instance. If the 
firm acquires various projects, it is essential that the accumulated wealth of the group is 
at least equal to the money invested in the divisions relating to each contract, because, in 
most cases, businessmen do not like heterogeneous corporations. The reason is they 
correspond to activities which demand extra effort. With reference to this point of view, 
some chief executives recognize that the entrepreneurs are probably right. This is the 
reason why businessmen are in favour of focused governance. From a similar 
perspective, in the opinion of US and British entrepreneurs, interlocking shareholdings at 
the beginning seemed to be unreasonable defensive mechanisms. There is one more point 
of view, why invest lump sums of money resources in businesses which are not under 
control? The Americans and British as indicated are not in favour of interlocking 
shareholdings. They also think that it is damaging, since the corporation is involved in 
commercial dealings which are not sustainable. The suitability of this structure is as 
follows quite restricted and it becomes acceptable only temporarily until the companies 
are prepared to disintegrate it.     
      Because of growing interest in the United States, the stockholders are now obliged to 
have a more influential part in business management. They cannot be inactive. As a 
consequence, they are favourably disposed to make clear their own company policy. This 
can be outlined by the following objectives, to underpin consolidation of control in every 
quarter and protection of the core business, to disintegrate heterogeneous corporations 
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and to externalize operations which are not useful or important, and to repurchase stocks 
when resources are not distributed to cost effective enterprises (Morin, 2000). Some 
executives acknowledge that it is implausible to get away from the requirements made by 
North American shareholders. 
      The discussion about the American and British stockholders focuses on the level of 
dividend yields which the stockowners are authorized to receive from the company. The 
proportion of earnings is worked out by examining two determining factors, the market 
value added from one point of view and a venture capital bonus associated with the 
enterprise or industry. A new ratio that is applied by analysts to measure the profitability 
is the Economic Value Added. With this method, when calculating the EVA the 
shareholder evaluates ex ante the company’s liquidity and profitability. This is possible 
by establishing the variation between the actual gain after working expenses and the cash 
flow needed for the payment of dividend yields. 
      Eventually, the general attitude of the chief executives has changed considerably in 
relation to the spread of ownership equity. Most of them believe it is not appropriate to 
describe this development in an unfavourable manner, as it contributes to the 
refurbishment of French capitalism. The managing directors will have to take into 
consideration the stockholders’ interests, and make an effort to satisfy their demands for 
generating profits. A few of them have argued for the general notion of vulnerability as 
they are confronted by the progressively global diffusion of the concept of ownership 
equity. Some are less favourably inclined to the spread of this culture, which they 
nevertheless must be prepared to subscribe to (ibid. 2000). But most of them recognize 
that it is now implausible not to implement the rules of conduct and the regulations. 
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      Finally, British equity owners appear to be generally inactive and discreet. Like their 
American counterparts, they exercise a latent control (Chaganti and Damanpour, 1991). 
They usually vote in favour of the manager and large shareholders and there are not many 
rules and regulations to restrain them. American equity owners normally abstain from 
voting in the conferences of foreign companies. Therefore, it seems that by not exercising 
their right to vote they permit British or French shareholders to control de facto the local 
firms. (Girard, 2000; L’Hélias, 1997). However, they use other methods, one has to do 
with unofficial pressure, self-interested activities designed to affect others’ decisions, 
within organizations they are often aimed at redistributing rents and quasirents and take 
the form of political activity or misrepresentation or distortion of information, and 
another has to do with official pressure such as proxy contest, in which outside dissident 
shareholders mount active solicitations aimed at gaining board representation or control, 
shareholder resolution is a measure requesting or instructing the board and management 
to follow particular policies (Gordon and Pound, 1993; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). In 
comparison, French equity owners appear to be either individualistic or institutionalized 
and they exert their latent control directly to an organization.     
       
The Golden Age of Equity Ownership 
 
      The growing significance of the financial systems from a socioeconomic point of 
view, is one more critical matter to be discussed. Firstly, what was the motive power of 
the increased significance of the financial markets in several developed countries? It is of 
special prominence to perceive the meaning of this transformation taking into account the 
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late developments that we have observed in financial systems. Does the boom in financial 
markets simply indicate an unrealistic project or is it proof of a lasting period of 
prosperity that will continue as a general trend in the future? Secondly, what are the 
consequences of the increased prominence of the financial systems for macroeconomic 
stability and growth? 
      Primarily, modern studies are concerned with the effect of the gradual evolution of 
the stock exchange in the national economy. Lately, there has been a trend to distinguish 
between individual stock markets as regards the impact that they have and, especially, the 
way in which they affect the management of public money. The dissimilarities have 
induced analysts to examine the merits of whether the inherent qualities of the stock 
exchange, such as the important role of organizational entrepreneurs, as opposed to 
banking organizations, makes a difference to the provision of capital for an enterprise 
(Allen and Gale, 2000; Carlin and Mayer, 2000; O’Sullivan, 2003). Expressing the same 
thing differently, they have come to be concerned with the analysis of the organizational 
structure of stock markets, and the influence they exert on socioeconomic progress. 
      Financial markets have a great effect on economic growth. A significant question to 
address is whether the firms are making use of their net profits predominantly to reclaim 
property and possessions, if that is true a giving out of shares is not very likely to have a 
large effect on the political, social and economic environment. This does not mean that 
the circulation of new stocks exercises no influence on the enterprise but that the 
allocation of resources will not affect the national economy. For instance, if a giving out 
of shares is utilized to assist a merging or leveraged buyout, the effect of such an 
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investment, to the degree that it occurs, will become manifest in the improvement of the 
productivity of the firms purchased or merged, and their competitiveness in the sector. 
      The Monory law enacted in the seventies, which authorized investors to savings 
issued in stocks exempt from taxes, is considered as the starting of a journey towards 
something higher. As the data indicates, this trajectory was not continuous with some 
years during which provision of capital dropped as a percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product. For instance, when the Left was in government in the eighties, and several big 
companies in France were nationalized, the provision of capital plunged from 9% in the 
early eighties to 6% in the mid eighties. It recuperated from the mid eighties and 
increased to 22% by the late eighties, as a wave of French denationalizations assisted the 
restructuring of the stock exchange. Nevertheless, this trend was briefly interrupted 
because of a failure in the financial systems and, in the late eighties, provision of capital 
came down by 16% in comparison with the mid eighties (Paris Bourse, 2003). The stock 
markets returned to health to arrive at 35% of GDP by the end of the eighties but in the 
early nineties the financial markets decreased by 21%, to make it to 33% of Gross 
Domestic Product. They dropped down slightly, to 32% of GDP, in the mid nineties. 
Since that time, the provision of capital has soared to arrive at 112% at the turn of the 
century (ibid. 2003). 
      In their quest for power during the nineties the Socialists pledged to stop the selling 
of national property. Once in office, nevertheless, Jospin’s party chose to follow another 
course. Between the late nineties and the beginning of the twenty-first century the 
Socialists traded national wealth valued at Ffr 168bn, exceeding the volume of 
denationalizations by the Balladur and Juppé parliaments from the early nineties to the 
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late nineties (O’Sullivan, 2003). Some of the French large firms that were denationalized 
in that period were CIC, CNP, Credit Fonsier, Credit Lyonnais, GAN, Societe 
Marsellaise de Credit, Thompson-CSF, and Thompson Multimedia. Besides, the state 
also traded stake holdings in Air France and France Telecom, even though it defined 
those dealings as the opening of the company’s capital instead of denationalization. 
      Chart 3 displays evidence of profits from IPOs between the seventies and the turn of 
the century. It illustrates that there was a rise in Initial Public Offerings in the mid 
eighties. IPOs decreased in the late eighties after a failure of the financial markets. They 
picked up for a short while but went down again in the early nineties. In the mid nineties 
they increased to a substantial €1,247m but then slightly decreased. In the late nineties, 
nevertheless, the estimated worth of profits from Initial Public Offerings in the French 
financial systems arrived at an all time high. They added up to a staggering €3.5bn during 
the late nineties in comparison with a total of €385m for the early nineties, €378m for the 
late eighties, €208m for the early eighties and a meager €25m for the late seventies. 
Chart 3: Public Share Offerings Related to Initial Public Offerings in France (millions of euros) 
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Source: Année Boursière, various years. 
      The quoted firms also accumulated wealth through the conversion of high 
indebtedness. Chart 4 demonstrates, that French quoted enterprises were strongly inclined 
to resort to the stock exchange for resources via the conversion of high debt. The 
distribution of convertible bonds built up in the mid nineties after a low point in the early 
nineties. In the late nineties, the sum of €27.5bn was levied through the conversion of 
high debt in contrast with €21.2bn in shares. The season 1999-2000 was of special 
prominence for the conversion of high indebtedness, in fact this couple of years makes up 
a proportion of 50% of the accumulated capital in convertible securities between the early 
nineties and the turn of the century. 
Chart 4: Public Offerings of Convertible Debt in France (millions of euros) 
 
 
 
Source: Année Boursière, various years. 
      With reference to share issues, we can also observe recent developments, from 
unpublished material. For instance, an enquiry into how shareholder value is 
recompensed by French firms discloses that the reimbursement of profits to stockholders 
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at 27% in the mid nineties as regards the distribution of dividend yields. More recently 
there was a sharp decrease in the reimbursement of profits to shareholders, and in the late 
nineties just 2% of dividend yields were distributed in this manner. Therefore, it is 
probable that other share issues are becoming more influential through interests 
associated with foreign stocks and worker shareholdings in French enterprises. Without 
doubt, the amount of foreign securities in France has grown fast since the mid eighties 
and particularly since the late nineties. 
      At the beginning of the new century, eighteen French firms had registered American 
Depository Receipts on the New York Stock Exchange and another fourteen enterprises 
had them indexed on the Nasdaq. They are also known as American Depository Shares, 
and are proceeds from stocks of a foreign firm which are entrusted to a US financial 
establishment. They authorize the proprietor to dividend yields and other profits on the 
securities but the stocks, and the ballots related to them, are consigned on behalf of the 
ADR owner to a US financial institution. It must be said, nevertheless, that ADRs may be 
converted into ordinary stocks at the owner’s demand. 
      The main objective for the denationalizations was the State’s shortage of revenue. 
One way or the other, all denationalizations culminated in the allocation of resources 
from the stock markets to the French ministry of finance. The most important reasons for 
the wave of denationalizations were economic, such as the necessity to subsidize the 
deficit of the public sector and to decrease the indebtedness. However, some of the 
reasons were political, such as the right wing government’s shift from Mitterrand’s 
Keynesianism in the mid eighties, Chirac’s extensive privatization plan incorporated 
sixty-five state controlled firms and a large number of banks, similar to the policy of Mrs 
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Thatcher in the United Kingdom his objective was to enlarge the number of French 
stockholders (Jefferys, 2003). The refurbishment and expansion of the French stock 
exchange aimed at two targets to reduce the cost of the budget deficit and assist the 
privatization of nationalized firms as opposed to raise new capital (Juvin, 1995). 
      What is interesting about the Initial Public Offerings, is that only in few of these 
cases, was the main incentive the accumulation of wealth for the quoted firm. In many 
occasions, e.g. CBC, ISIS, Rhodia, Technip and particularly Alstom, there was no 
allocation of resources from the financial systems to the listed enterprise as a result of the 
IPO, in fact, Pierre Bilger, the president of Alstom, described the IPO as a homage to the 
good management of the previous years and he announced that the money was raised to 
fund the purchase of Cegelec (La Tribune, 03/06/98).   In some instances, the quoted firm 
accumulated wealth as part of its strategy but this accounted for a small number of the 
profits from the transaction. Anyway, the main objective of the Initial Public Offering for 
the enterprises was to wind up their affairs by ascertaining liabilities and apportioning 
assets. We can deduce, from the facts, that the IPO, at least with regard to the Premier 
Marché, has been basically about the conveyance of rights or titles to ownership among 
stockholders instead of the allocation of resources to the firm listed on the stock 
exchange. Business Objects was a special case, in the way that the funds from the Initial 
Public Offering circulated into the enterprise, but constant to the same principles the 
accumulation of wealth was not the main incentive for registration on the Premier 
Marché (Business Wire, 05/11/99). 
Table 9: Domestic Initial Public Offerings on the Premier Marché 
 
Year Company Money Raised Description 
1998 Alstom 3,779.0 Spinoff 
1992 CBC     38.9 Spinoff 
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1994 Coflexip   123.6 Spinoff 
2000 EADS n.v. 2,308.5  
2000 Euler   479.5  
1997 ISIS   219.4 Spinoff 
1998 Rhodia 1,128.9 Spinoff 
1994 Technip     64.5 Spinoff 
2000 Vivendi Environment 2,361.5  
2000 Wanadoo 1,710.0  
 
Source: Année Boursière, various years. 
      The concept that firms utilize their IPOs to accumulate wealth for development seems 
to be much more appropriate for enterprises quoted on the Nouveau Marché than the PM. 
That NM firms have been favourably disposed to utilize their Initial Public Offerings to 
accumulate capital for growth, comes as no surprise, taking into consideration that they 
are less independent than enterprises listed on the Premier Marché. Nevertheless, it must 
be stated that it is required by law that enterprises involved in IPOs in the Nouveau 
Marché invest fifty percent or more of the profits from the transaction to subsidize their 
expansion. This indicates that even if the main objective of the Initial Public Offering 
was for the firm to be wound up and have its assets apportioned, the constraining power 
of the law dictates to spend a large percentage of the receipts for the enterprise. 
      A couple of nationalized firms which made an effort to raise capital are listed among 
the most profitable transactions that took place in the nineties. The deal in which GAN, 
the French financial group, amassed Ffr 10.9bn in the late nineties was part of a project 
laid out by the French government to rebuild and subsidize the enterprise prior to its 
denationalization. The French state contributed to 84% of the allocated resources and the 
outstanding 16% was put together by institutional investors and other stockholders (Les 
Echos, 13/11/97). The raising of new capital by Machines Bull in the nineties was 
another undertaking backed up by its large stockowners in expectation of the firm’s 
denationalization. The French public sector, which controlled 72% of the French 
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electronics conglomerate subscribed to about Ffr 7.0bn, France Telecom as well 
contributed to around Ffr 1.6bn, and Bull’s other stockholders, IBM and NEC were also 
requested to put together a lump sum of approximately Ffr 700m. The new allocation of 
resources was intended to assist Bull to decrease its high leverage and arrived shortly 
after the French state had invested a further Ffr 2.5bn in the enterprise in the early 
nineties (Reuters News Services, 18/10/1993).  
Table 10: Ten Largest Public Seasoned Share Offerings for Cash 
 
Year Issuer Amount Purpose 
1996 Axa   5,904,475 Purchase of its shares 
1994 Euro Disney   5,950,290 Recapitalization 
1994 Eurotunnel   7,287,397 Recapitalization 
1990 Eurotunnel   5,634,041 Internal Development 
1997 GAN 10,982,668 Recapitalization 
1993 Machines Bull   8,549,781 Recapitalization 
1997 Rhône-Poulenc   7,000,000 Acquisition 
1990 UAP  10,500,000 Acquisition 
1998 Valéo   6,800,000 Acquisition 
1999 Vivendi Environment 17,909,557 Acquisition 
 
Source: Année Boursière, various years. 
      As a final point, the late registrations by Publicis Groupe and Vivendi Universal, 
were prompted by their acquisitions of Saatchi and Saatchi and Seagram. Publicis Groupe 
purchased the British firm’s American Depository Receipts quoted on the New York 
Stock Exchange when it decided to buy out Saatchi and Saatchi. Vivendi Universal had 
ADRs indexed on the NYSE so as to assist its merger with Seagram, the Canadian firm 
and American entrepreneurs evidently exerted influence on the group to use them as an 
acquisition currency. Suppliers of American Depository Receipts have to conform with 
US rules and regulations which serves as an explanation for their appeal to American 
entrepreneurs in comparison with other securities (Global Investor, 2000). According to 
one of them, if you put an ADR in place, you are essentially submitting in one form or 
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another to US SEC practice and to US regulation, for a US investor, that is a comfort (JP 
Morgan, 2000).  
      When the change of management associates with international property, particularly 
when French enterprises utilized a circulation of shares to finance the buyout of overseas 
firms, the allocation of resources is complicated. In several occasions French enterprises 
made use of the financial systems in order to support their policies for enlargement of the 
scale of commercial operations abroad. Although these policies may have pushed forward 
these firms to global status in the stock exchange, we can not immediately accept that 
their enhanced competitiveness results in the betterment of the social and economic 
environment. This is true, only to the degree that the dividend yields paid to French 
shareholders are maximized as a consequence of the international developments. 
      This investigation proposes that to comprehend the interaction of capital and 
development on each other we have to draw distinctions between enterprises, so as to 
evaluate the allocation of resources from the bourse, and the organizations with which it 
is affiliated, like institutional investors and banking corporations, to the economy. In this 
section, I have demonstrated the specific outcomes of such a comparative analysis for the 
financial systems of France during the past twenty years or so. The findings endorse that 
there is a lot to be learned from more explorations into the part that the stock markets 
have in accumulating wealth for capitalist economies, a part that is considered by analysts 
to be of great effect and the most significant for macroeconomic stability and progress. 
Of special prominence is the fact that most of the accumulated wealth in the bourse 
helped the French State and improved the performance of French firms, and it was 
utilized primarily to assist the change of management and to reclaim property and 
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possessions. These specific outcomes indicate that we must not take it for granted that the 
raising of capital in money markets results in the augmentation of the allocation of 
resources to national economies, it is more probable to culminate in the decrease of the 
influence of other organizations, such as banking groups, on monetary policy as well as 
in the reconstruction of investment management. What is more, with regard to 
socioeconomic growth, the theory which ascribes this progress to the emergence of 
financial intermediaries, who can make good use of the favourable circumstances, as a 
consequence of the reform of corporate governance will have to take into account the role 
of the incumbent. 
 
The Latin Variety in Comparison 
 
      In all three nations considered in this project, chief executives are accountable to the 
stockholders. In the academic literature of corporate governance some scholars suggest 
that in reality managing directors do not pursue the interests of equity owners (Allen and 
Gales, 2000). To the contrary they pursue their own interests which culminates in 
ineffectiveness. The contradiction between the responsibilities of chief executives and the 
protection of stockholders has been emphasized by several experts and resulted in the 
evolution of the agency theory in corporate management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hart, 
1995; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The agency approach to business administration 
concentrates on the question how can shareholders ensure that managers pursue the 
shareholders interests. Some scholars have successfully attempted to answer this question 
(Schleifer and Vishny, 1997). My argument is there are limitations in this proposition. A 
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comparative analysis of business systems between countries such as the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Germany and France provides for an alternative. 
      In the US and the UK the executive committee is comprised of outsiders and insiders, 
the latter being the managing directors of the company. It is unusual that the Chief 
Executive Officer is not in the committee. In both countries the chief executive officer is 
usually the chairman of the firm. It is the executive committee that decides on the 
strategy to be followed by the company. The task of managers is to realize the policy 
decided by the committee. Stockholders have a small role to play in decision-making 
apart from voting for executives. For instance, it is the executives who take the decision 
on their own wages, without the stockholders. A board of outsiders decides on the general 
manager’s salary. It is only in cases of a proxy contest that the outsiders are elected by 
the incumbent manager and therefore normally remain loyal to the chief executive. 
      In Germany corporate governance is different, fifty percent of executives are selected 
by stockholders and fifty percent by workers. The shareholder representatives are 
selected in stockholder conferences. Two thirds of worker delegates are employed by the 
firm and one third are labour institution representatives. The executive committee selects 
a chairman and a vice chairman among the executives. More than two thirds of the voters 
are needed for a chief executive to be selected. As a consequence, the chairman is often 
from the stockholder group and the vice chairman is from the worker group. In the case 
of an equal number of votes in the executive committee the chairman has an extra vote. It 
is in this way that stockholders direct a company. 
      In France the most usual structure is single tiered as in the Anglo-Saxon variety. The 
executive committee selects the Président Directeur Général, who is like a Chief 
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Executive Officer. He/she is the only person who can represent the firm and is also the 
only one who can transfer this authority. Single tiered committees are usually comprised 
of outsiders who are stockholders and reps from other enterprises with which the 
company has contractual relations. As in the Anglo-Saxon variety the committee decides 
on the strategy which is then implemented by the président directeur général. There is 
also an organizational structure with two tiers, like in Germany. The Conseil de 
Surveillance is like the supervisory board apart from the fact that the workers can not be 
represented. Nevertheless, one distinct element of the French system, which brings it 
closer to the German one, is that regardless of the style of governance, the employee 
delegates enjoy the privilege of attending the conferences of the executive committees in 
all firms with more than fifty workers. 
      With regard to regulatory restrictions and share ownership the United Kingdom is less 
regulated than the United States. Banking corporations are unrestricted to share 
ownership and as long as it is permitted by the Bank of England to large shareholding 
blocks. Insurance companies are restricted only by the necessity to spread investment 
which is self imposed. With reference to shareholdings of non financial institutions, the 
only restriction is that companies should not own each other’s equity to restrain a hostile 
takeover. In Germany and France there are regulations on share ownership with regard to 
banking corporations. In both countries there are also restrictions on the amount of 
companies that can be controlled. 
      Scholars have researched into the relation of management effectiveness and different 
performance indicators in France, Germany and the United States (Allen and Gales, 
2000; Kaplan, 1994). They found that there is a similar relation in all countries, e.g. large 
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shareholding blocks and strong affiliation to a major banking corporation appear to be 
quite effective. Other scholars confirm these findings for Japan and have also provided 
evidence on the efficiency of distinct styles of business administration (Kang and 
Shivdasani, 1995). Their results indicate that the existence of outsiders in the executive 
committee has only a small impact on the sensitivity of chief executives or managing 
directors to earnings or stock prices. 
      In the market for corporate control, takeovers happen more frequently in the U.S. and 
the U.K. Scholars have reported that in the United States more than ten per cent of firms 
included in the Fortune 500 have been acquired since the eighties in a deal that was 
hostile (Prowse, 1995). For the United Kingdom, other scholars have reported there were 
thirty five hostile bids that took place in the mid eighties (Franks and Mayer, 1992). This 
is much more frequent than in Germany or France. In Germany, it was reported that there 
have only been three hostile takeovers which have been documented since World War II 
(Franks and Mayer, 1993). In France, it was reported that there were no hostile takeovers 
between the forties and the nineties (Vives, 2000). 
      What is the reason for the differences in business administration between countries? 
Scholars have suggested that corporate governance evolves in relation to regulatory 
restrictions (Prowse, 1990). Other scholars have indicated that in comprehending the 
distinct organizational frameworks of business administration in a cross country analysis 
it is significant to take into consideration the evolution of the economic environment 
(Roe, 1994). The argument is that the United States and the United Kingdom opted for a 
business system where the authority of financial organizations such as banking 
corporations is restricted. As a consequence they could not have an important part in 
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business administration. In Germany and France a distinct economic landscape has 
facilitated banks to become engaged with corporate governance. 
      The opinion that German and French companies do not work for the stockholders is 
endorsed by available data. In spite of the organizational change the evidence 
demonstrates that France persists as a stakeholder economy that is more akin to the 
German model. On the one hand, chief executives in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, 75.6 per cent and 70.5 per cent respectively viewed that shareholders were the 
most significant. On the other hand, executives in Germany and France, 82.7 per cent and 
78 per cent respectively stated that stakeholders are more important. Chart 5 displays the 
preferences of managing directors in a survey of large enterprises in the nations 
compared between two distinct options, shareholder interest should be given the first 
priority (red), or a company exists for the interests of all stakeholders (blue). 
Chart 5: Whose Company Is It? (%) 
 
Source: Institute of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, 1999. 
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      The questionnaire asked the managing directors what their choices were with 
reference to dividends and job security. Chart 6 illustrates their preferences. Once again 
there is a sharp distinction between the United States and the United Kingdom on the one 
hand and Germany and France on the other. Managing directors were requested to select 
from the following options, executives should maintain dividend payments, even if they 
must lay off a number of employees (red), or executives should maintain stable 
employment, even if they must reduce dividends (blue). 
Chart 6: Job Security or Dividends (%) 
 
Source: Institute of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, 1999. 
      The results on executives’ choices about the role of the company are supported by the 
manner that wages are determined in the nations considered. In the United States and the 
United Kingdom wages are dependent on the nature of work. Workers’ personal 
circumstances bear a small influence on remuneration. In France and Germany, it is very 
usual for employees to have family allowances and other perks for younger workers. In 
both countries, vacation allowances are widespread. These discrepancies and 
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irregularities indicate that in the U.S. and the U.K. the company is organizationally 
structured to pursue the interests of stockholders while in France and Germany it is a 
grand design of people who act together. 
      To conclude this comparative analysis it becomes appropriate to reflect upon the three 
chapters altogether. The coordinated market economy in Germany has experienced 
incremental adjustment towards a hybrid model but remains distant to a liberal market 
economy. The United Kingdom has followed the European path although the inherent 
characteristics of a liberal market economy persist. France has become more Anglo-
Saxon though the state retains a central role which makes it more akin to a coordinated 
market economy. The fact that the three varieties of capitalism have all been adjusted by 
moving towards different directions makes it possible to speak of a convergence in the 
future which essentially diverts from the Washington Consensus.      
       
Conclusions 
 
      Deregulation, privatization, and workplace relationships decentralization, totally 
transformed the character of the French state, by lessening the influence of its 
interventionist policy in conjunction with the liberalization of financial establishments 
that increased the independence of companies by providing with new capital. Moreover, 
European Union legislation which kept under control state funding for businesses also 
restricted the government. Despite of this devolution, the state did not entirely abstain 
from exercising authority and influence on managers or workers, in the right 
circumstances. 
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      It is possible that the main reason for the centralized steering of the economy by the 
state was to a considerable degree the view that the families in charge of the French 
economy in previous years were restraining its development. However, the French elite 
were convinced that a change in management was not adequate for economic and social 
recuperation. Other strategies would have to be followed, it was maintained, to give a 
new lease on life to France’s corporate governance and its affiliated institutions. In a 
determined attempt to achieve this clear objective, the French government chose to 
follow a distinct course of action for the reform of business administration. One of the 
most important methods to exercise power was its involvement with French financial 
affairs. The state also recommended a wide range of strategies for the betterment of 
France’s higher education and vocational training, and the work directed towards the 
introduction and improvement of products and services (Amable et al. 1997). 
      The nature of French capitalism is typified by state mediation, subsidies and taxes 
levied on particular occasions, and up to the eighties, the politicians were the most 
significant actors in French fiscal matters. There was a growing concern, as a result, that 
large firms would not be capable of a comeback. With regard to the recent past, in fact, it 
was almost certain that the reconstruction of corporate governance should be anticipated 
to happen through the state (Cohen, 1989). With the intention of escaping from the 
inconsistent and outdated structure they were trapped, throughout the period since the 
French model of Fordist production had started to subside, the big companies were in 
need of a radical change (Hancké, 2003; Howell, 1992). 
      The transformation seems to be a fundamental and sudden switch from the traditional 
and established practices of Taylorist management (Schwamberger and Yami, 2000). As 
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a result, in my view, there is not a special form of procedure to restructure business 
administration. However, to bring managers into agreement with workers the concept of 
flexibility is imperative so that each firm chooses the most appropriate model. This 
system provides essential support for organized negotiations, and we also observed that 
employees are now becoming more involved in work time agreements. As a 
consequence, organizational operations and phases in production are not disintegrated. 
Remuneration is not the one and only objective for workers, the increase of the 
importance of their task also acts as a significant motivation. Finally, the new settlements 
of disputes call in question the range of effectiveness of the old structure. Nevertheless, 
we notice that it is basically a matter of restraining its antagonistic character. 
      In this chapter I have made an effort to demonstrate the institutional 
complementarities which attach special prominence on the interaction between industrial 
relations, financial markets and business administration. To understand the rise of Total 
Quality Management in business administration it is of great importance to examine the 
most recent developments in the area of industrial relations. Scholars of one subject for 
the most part attempt to interpret the incremental adjustments in a particular area by 
looking into the ongoing developments in that subject. The studies in corporate 
governance will look into the institutions which exercise authority on decision making 
and check on what policy makers in these institutions have done in the recent past, while 
others will analyze how changes in the non state owned enterprises are determined by the 
most recent developments in financial markets (Goedegeburre, 1993). Corporate 
governance is an area affected by path dependency, but this may well change into path 
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departure when goals are set, and they do not originate from the same discipline but from 
different fields. 
      The procedure of the selection of managing directors is performed by the grand corps, 
the highest point of France’s business administration, progression to which is dependent 
on experience gained at a leading grande école. Experts describe the grand corps as 
placement bureaux, suggesting that no one was accepted in the Inspection des Finances to 
administrate the reserves, or the Corps des Mines to work in mining (Suleiman, 1978). 
Once they spend nearly a decade working for the state, often in civil service, managers 
are promoted to the chief executives committee of a big company, a process defined as 
parachutage or pantouflage. The ones who come from prominent families seek to obtain 
qualifications so as to legitimate their position which provides an interpretation of the 
continuation of the elite in France, and the present political and social climate. 
      This research draws attention to the entrepreneur as the driving force of institutional 
change. In this context, a manager is defined by distinctive qualities. One of these 
attributes was demonstrated in section seven, the presence of an intellectual background 
capable of challenging the dominant ideology. Nevertheless, an innovative concept in 
institutional transformation is not adequate to affect a system of economic theories. This 
is to be reasonably expected, when the entrepreneur is willing to commit himself to this 
purpose. It is evident why, in theory, it is not the managing director who interacts with 
the institutional structure. The motive power of innovation is, in general, considered to be 
the reciprocal action between establishments and societies (North, 1993). Consequently, 
the organization may well be regarded as a platform to exert socioeconomic influence. It 
must be stated, however, that the organizations which assist the entrepreneur in his effort 
The Reform of Corporate Governance in France 97 
to produce an effect on corporate governance are not restricted to the stock exchange. 
The heads of different institutions such as the civil service, trade unions, employer 
associations and banks can often resort to their own capital in order to bring in new 
methods. 
      The increase in proceeds, subsequent to denationalizations, to a degree is dependent 
on the volume of stocks allotted to a dominant shareholder and organizational 
entrepreneurs from overseas. If, in agreement with this fundamental law of corporate 
governance such a proposition is common, inasmuch as it is a priori based on the 
influence of the discipline related to a concentrated shareholding and organizational 
entrepreneurs from abroad, when the dominant shareholder is for the most part the State, 
what is supportive of the arguments of financial analysts, in accordance with which this 
constraint results in a significant enhancement of productivity following privatizations, 
challenges the basic assumption of the bad influence of the State on the competitiveness 
(Ehlrich et al. 1994; Verbrugge 1999). The takeovers which are accompanied by a 
progressive disengagement of the State will have a higher probability of recovery. The   
favourable   conditions   associated   with organizational entrepreneurs from abroad are a 
consequence of the international legislation related to corporate governance. 
      Ultimately, the shared ideology of the managing directors has altered significantly in 
respect of the diffusion of shareholder value. The majority of them think it is wrong to 
consider this evolvement as something undesirable, as it adds to the modernization of the 
French model. The chief executives will have to take into account the stockowners’ 
claims, and also attempt to meet the expectations for the maximization of dividend yields. 
Some of them have made a case for a feeling of insecurity as they must deal with the 
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spread of the increasingly popular idea of shareholder value. A weak minority are still 
resistant to the diffusion of such an ideology, which they however must be ready to 
comply with (Morin, 2000). But most of them accept that it is now impossible not to 
apply the required principles. 
      When the transfer of control relates to cross-border acquisitions, especially when 
French firms used a distribution of securities to fund the purchase of other companies, the 
allotment of capital is complex. In many cases French firms had recourse to the stock 
markets so as to underpin their strategy for expansion of the scope of business activities 
overseas. Even though this strategy has brought into prominence these companies in the 
international financial markets, we must be cautious not to assume that their increased 
reputation also culminates in the improvement of the national economy. This is a fact, to 
the extent that the profits remunerated to French stockholders are enhanced to the utmost 
because of the global operations. 
      The complementarity of the political economy with corporate governance was first 
identified by scholars who reported on the significance of regulatory restrictions as 
determining factors in the evolution of business administtration (Bris and Cabolis, 2002; 
La Porta et al. 2002). Regulatory restrictions act as determining factors for the 
dissimilarities across nations, and the effect of these differences on the level of 
investment, the diversification of financial systems, a company’s strategy and objectives, 
the amount of dividends, and share ownership. This chapter expanded the existent 
academic literature by assessing the impact of organizational change in corporate 
governance stimulated by cross border acquisitions and by concentrating on a 
comparative analysis.    
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